Fifty/Fifty: Ending Sex Segregation in School Sports by George, B. Glenn
Fifty/Fifty:
Ending Sex Segregation in School Sports
B. GLENN GEORGE*
Title IX is now thirty years old, yet we still struggle to define "sex
discrimination" in the context of school sports programs. By continuing to
accept the concept of segregation and protecting "contact sports" from female
encroachment, we continue to protect this male controlled and dominated aspect
of our educational system. Our reward has been a world of "big time" college
sports that has far more in common with professional sports than the
educational enterprise. These programs frequently undermine and sometimes
overwhelm the educational values our schools purport to espouse. We can only
gain control of this problem by fundamentally rethinking and restructuring the
enterprise. The author proposes the end of sex segregation by requiring that all
school sports teams be halffemale and half male (both in terms of numbers and
playing time). To the extent that such a drastic proposal might change the very
nature of sports and how they are played, such outcomes may reflect exactly the
kind of leadership our schools should be providing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The civil rights movement and the women's movement have spawned
decades of debate on the concept of equality. Sometimes the answers have been
glaringly obvious; other times they have been elusive. In the early days of these
movements, discrimination was often blatant, with jobs reserved for only whites
or only men. Such explicit, facial distinctions have all but vanished in the face of
constitutional claims (under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment') and Title V1I 2 mandates (prohibiting race and sex discrimination in
employment). One significant exception, however, is sports, where we continue
to accept, expect, and even defend sex segregation as the status quo.
Title IX,3 added in 1972 to a growing list of civil rights statutes, prohibits sex
discrimination by any educational institution receiving federal funds-a group
encompassing virtually all colleges and universities, as well as most middle/
junior highs and high schools. By almost any measure, there has been tremendous
progress in women's sports since 1972--dramatic increases in the number of
women playing sports, huge increases in the money invested (albeit starting from
almost nothing), and noteworthy increases in popularity of women's sports (with
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My thanks to Tun Davis
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I U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1994).
3 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the U.S. World Cup women's soccer team and the relative success of professional
women's basketball).
Nonetheless, after thirty years, the issue of sex discrimination remains a
frustrating puzzle in intercollegiate and secondary school athletics. Two recent
lawsuits symbolize much of the problem of sex equality in sports. Mercer v. Duke
Universily4 highlights our continuing legal judgment that women may be
excluded from men's sports when there is any plausible argument that they might
get hurt. And Fuhr v. Hazel Park School District5 reminds us that there is at least
one job (other than military combat6) that society implicitly believes women are
too incompetent to perforn-coaching male athletes.
As frustrating as these stubborn strands of discrimination may be, however,
intercollegiate athletics is being poisoned by an even bigger problem--the
erosion of academic and financial integrity under the corrupting influences of
commercialization and professional sports. Rule violations, low graduation rates,
million dollar coaching contracts, broadcast rights, and corporate sponsorships in
the big-time programs have all but destroyed any ties between higher education
and its high profile sports teams. Whatever educational values we may have once
thought imbedded in these athletic endeavors have been buried in the escalating
competition for money and exposure. This article suggests that these problems-
gender (in)equity and commercialization--are inherently linked.
In defiance of any conceivable educational mission statements, school sports
in general, and intercollegiate athletics in particular, broadcast two clear
messages: the "important" sports are about men and money. At the intercollegiate
level, the best programs are those that attract the biggest television contracts and
corporate sponsorships--an elite category defined primarily by football and
men's basketball. Should academics stand in the way, they will be compromised
or brushed aside altogether. Women athletes effectively get the same treatment. In
spite of the growing participation in, support for, and popularity of women's
sports, female athletes continue to be left behind in this escalating "arms race.' 7
Evidence is growing of both the enormity of the problem and our apparent
inability to address it or even stem the tide. The corruption of high-profile men's
sports on the one hand, and the struggle for gender equity on the other hand,
define the losing battle between the aspirations of our educational institutions and
the world of sports.
4 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
5 131 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
6 See Kingsley R. Browne, Women at War: An Evolutionary Perspective, 49 BUFFALO L.
REV. 51 (2001) (arguing that the physical and emotional differences between men and women,
and the costs associated with including women in combat, justify women's exclusion).
7 See JOHN S. & JAMEs L. KNIGHT FOUND., A CALL TO ACMON: RECONNECTING COLLEGE
SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION 16 (June 2001), available at
http://www.knightfdn.org/default.asp?story=news at knight/special-reports/coi-athletics'html
[hereinafter KNIGHT REPORT 2001]; infra notes 148-65 and accompanying text.
1108 [Vol. 63:1107
FIFTY/FIFTY
Mercer v. Duke University illustrates that, in the world of school sports, even
simple issues of facial or formal equality-treating similarly situated men and
women in similar ways--are not so simple after all. Mercer sought a position on
the Duke University football team as a walk-on place-kicker, a position she had
successfully played on her high school football team. She was permitted to
participate in off-season training, and, after kicking the winning field goal in the
spring scrimmage, was told by the coach that she had made the team. The coach
later changed his mind, however-allegedly fed up with the distraction of the
attendant publicity-and removed Mercer from the roster.8
Never mind that the coach had never cut a male from the Duke football
team.9 Never mind that Mercer apparently was at least as skilled as one or more
of the male place-kickers who were permitted to remain on the team. And never
mind that the coach suggested Mercer try cheerleading or beauty pageants
instead. 10 But Mercer sued, and the jury quickly picked Mercer's team. The jury
awarded Mercer $2 million in punitive damages. Duke University's appeal is
pending.
Was Mercer v. Duke University a big victory for women in sports? Yes and
no. There is a caveat to that hefty verdict that threatens to undermine the dreams
of any girl hoping to play football or other sports with the boys: Duke University
legally could have refused Mercer any opportunity to try out for the football team
at all. As explained more fully below, Title IX permits a school to prohibit any
woman from competing on a men's team defined as a "contact sport."' "I Duke
could have avoided liability by rejecting Mercer's request for a tryout in the first
place regardless of her kicking skills-no second-guessing and no Monday
morning quarterbacking on how she was, or should have been treated. The happy
ending for Mercer thus has an unfortunate potential for backlash. As an institution
of higher education, which would you choose---trust the football coach to treat a
potential female player equitably or avoid the problem altogether by prohibiting
all women from trying out?12
Geraldine Fuhr's complaint may cause even more celebration or more
squirming among those who follow these issues closely. According to the
evidence submitted on summary judgment, Geraldine Fuhr was the varsity coach
8 See Welch Suggs, Will Female Kicker's Legal Victory Reshape Gender Roles in
Athletics?, CHRON. IGHER EDuc., Oct. 27, 2000, at A53.
9 Alex Tresniowski et al., Kicking Up a Storm, PEOPLE, Oct. 30, 2000, at 69.
10 Kate Stone Lombardi, A Victory for a Girl Who Loved to Kick, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2000, § 14 WC, at 5.
11 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
12 See generally Suggs, supm note 8. One irritated (female) junior college football kicker
reported that interest from four-year schools quickly cooled in the aftermath of the Mercer
verdict. College Football SpotlightWeek 12; They Need Kick in Pants, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2000, at ID9 (reporting on an interview with Tonya Butler, a kicker for the Middle Georgia
College football team).
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for the high school girls' varsity basketball team, a position she had held for ten
years. Fuhr had also served nine years as the boys' junior varsity coach and eight
years as an assistant to the boys' varsity coach.13 When the boys' varsity coach
resigned, Fuhr applied for the vacancy. Although both the school's principal and
athletic director supported Fuhr's application, the school district selected instead
the only other applicant for the position-John Barnett, the coach for the ninth-
grade boys for only two years.14 Fuhr sued for employment discrimination and
won. The jury awarded her $445,000-more than double the amount in damages
suggested by Fuhr's attorney. 15
Mercer and Fuhr-a student trying to play with the boys and a coach trying
to coach the boys-represent two fundamental and continuing barriers to equality
in sports. As long as we continue to believe each is out of place in the role to
which she aspires, we are unlikely to move beyond the discrimination that
continues to pervade the world of school sports.
But sex equality is hardly the only problem facing school sports in general
and intercollegiate athletics in particular. While many would and have argued that
there is much remaining to be done to achieve true gender equality in college
sports, most would agree that we have been moving in a positive direction and
much has been accomplished. In another arena, however, things seem to be
getting worse instead of better. Perhaps far more pressing in the world of
intercollegiate athletics is the rapidly growing gap between sports and the
fundamental goals and aspirations of our educational institutions.
This second (and arguably interrelated) issue-the increasing
"professionalization" of intercollegiate athletics-looms large in the world of
higher education. At most Division I-A' 6 schools, the myth that athletics operate
as an integral part of the educational institution was debunked years ago. The
alarm was officially sounded in 1991 by the Knight Foundation Commission on
Intercollegiate Athletics, a distinguished panel of current and former university
officials (and others). 17 The Commission concluded that intercollegiate athletics
"threaten to overwhelm the universities in whose name they were established." In
2001, the Commission reconvened to review its recommendations of 1991 to
restore academic and financial integrity to college sports. Sadly, the Commission
13 Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of Hazel Park, 131 F. Supp. 2d 947, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
14 Id. at 949. The school district defended its decision on the grounds that the girls' varsity
season overlaps the boys' season by a week. Id. at 951.
15 Matt Helms, Female Coach Wins Bias Suit, DEROrr FREE PREss, Aug. 8, 2001, at IA.
16 Division I-A is the highest level of competition sponsored by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA).
17 JOHN S. & JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUND., Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New
Model for Intercollegiate Athletics, in REPORTS OF THE KNIGHT COMMISSION ON
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLEIcs 14 (1999), available at http://www.knightfdn.org/default.asp?
story=newsatknight/special-reports/coiathletics.html [hereinafter KNIGHT REPORT 1991];
see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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reported that "the threat has grown rather than diminished.' 8 'T"he fallout from
having already waited too long to act is all the more reason to persevere. Each
passing day compounds the academic corruption and makes the need for curative
measures more compelling."19
The Knight Commission pleads with college and university presidents to
regain control of a world that now operates virtually independent of any serious
academic oversight. The highest profile programs, according to the Commission,
already are characterized by "weakened academic and amateurism standards,
millionaire coaches and rampant commercialism, all combined increasingly with
deplorable sportsmanship and misconduct." 20 And for those who seek more
"academic" support for these conclusions, many of the same findings can be
found in the carefully researched work of James Shulman and William Bowen
studying athletes over several decades at thirty colleges and universities ranging
from Swarthmore to the University of Michigan. 21
These almost overwhelming problems-money, professionalism, and
commercialism on the one hand, and the continuing struggle to define and
implement gender equality on the other hand-are inevitably linked. The center
of the commercialization problem is football and men's basketball-the same two
sports early opponents of Title IX wanted to protect.22 With the overwhelming
pressure to funnel more and more money and effort into these teams, women's
athletics continue to fight for funding and respect.
Simple solutions rarely resolve complicated problems. A myriad of
possibilities has been offered by the Knight Commission, commentators, and
scholars to address the issues of gender equity for women student athletes, the
relative dearth of women in coaching positions, and the complex factors that
threaten the academic and financial integrity of our universities.23 The Knight
Commission surely is correct that only wholesale reform and rethinking of our
basic premises have a chance of returning this endeavor to the core of our
aspirations for educational institutions. But most of these proposals continue to
tinker at the edges of these vast problems rather than striking at the heart by
reconstituting the entire enterprise.
This article proposes that educational institutions, from middle schools to
universities, reject the fundamental premise of segregation-something we have
demanded in virtually every other arena of our society. The "simple" solution
18 KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 11.
19 Id at22.
20 Id at 23.
21 JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND
EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2001); see infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
22 Cf id at 299 ("The number of male football players creates severe issues of gender
equity in athletics for schools at every level of play. Colleges such as Haverford that do not play
football have a much easier time complying with Title IX.") (citation omitted).
23 See infra notes 165, 177, 181-84 and accompanying text.
2002]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
proposed here is the institution of mandatory coed teams in all sports. Here I am
proposing "coed" in the most extreme sense-all teams would be half male and
half female, with the further requirement that half of the players on the field or
court at any given time would also be half women.24 As discussed more fully
below, this single change has the potential of eliminating most gender equity
problems (including the contact sports rule), integrating women as respected
coaches at all levels, and perhaps even diminishing the destructive forces that tie
college athletics to professional sports instead of the educational mission of the
school.
I have always applauded articles, particularly in this area, that attempt to
propose both concrete and realistic solutions.25 For this reason, my instincts are to
shy away from suggestions that seem beyond any hope of consideration or
adoption. I thus have reached my conclusions with some reluctance, knowing that
the idea of coed college football alone is enough to drive my arguments into the
realm of ridicule. But I have also become convinced that only something
requiring changes at the core can have any hope of gaining control of the
problems that permeate college sports and returning an "extracurricular" activity
to its rightful place in our education system.
I should be clear that my concern is school sports (both secondary and
intercollegiate) and only school sports. I have no interest in, and am untroubled by
any potential impact on, professional sports. My primary issue is athletics in the
public arena as a function of our educational system. It is in this environment,
rather than the world of money that drives professional sports, that the issues of
sex discrimination and the fundamental values of our colleges and universities
must be addressed. We should aspire to something more than staying just inside
the limits of the law. If our school athletic programs continue to defy instead of
reflect the educational mission of their institutions, we have no business playing
the game at all.
Part one of this article reviews briefly the history of Title IX, focusing in
particular on issues of team segregation by sex, the contact sports rule, and the
legal challenges presented in Mercer. Part two considers the segregation of
coaches, reflected in the Fuhr case. Findings of the Knight Commission and the
research of Shulman and Bowen are briefly presented in part three. Finally, part
24 Individual sports under my proposal (such as track, swimming, tennis, etc.) could
continue to match women against women and men against men, as long as there were equal
participants in all events and team scores combined both men's and women's events to
determine the institutional winner of the match or meet. The NCAA currently uses a similar
practice in a few sports, such as skiing. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
25 One commentator suggested, for example, that males be permitted to try out for a spot
on a women's team "where the denial of the sport to males rests on cultural assumptions about
the sport's femininity." Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory
Behind Title IX, 34 MICH. J.L. REFoRM 13, 145 (2000). Although the feminist theoretical basis
for such a proposal is a compelling one, it is difficult to visualize (mostly male) athletic
directors or NCAA administrators making such abstract decisions.
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four explores the alternative of coed sports, examining the legal, practical, and
cultural obstacles and benefits of such a proposal.
II. TRITE IX, SEGREGATED TEAMS AND THE CONTACr SPORTS RULE:
SEPARATE BUT (RARELY) EQUAL
A. Title IX
Most gender discrimination issues in sports have focused on the federal
statute passed in 1972 prohibiting sex discrimination in activities controlled by
federal fund recipients---better known as 'Title IX." 26 The history of Title IX and
its regulations have been reviewed at length by other scholars and are
summarized only briefly here.27 Title IX itself makes no mention of sports, nor
was the issue a focus of the debate preceding its enactment. The statute merely
prohibits educational institutions receiving federal funds from discriminating "on
the basis of sex" in any programs or activities.28
Once the potential impact of the legislation on college sports caught the
attention of sports enthusiasts and Congress, there was both fear and hope that
Title IX might drastically change the nature of sports. The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA)29 lobbied strenuously to exempt intercollegiate
athletics altogether. 30 A compromise amendment proposed by Senator John
26 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
27 See, e.g., ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOwN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE
IX (1994); B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 1995 Wisc. L. REv. 647 (1995); Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise
Chronological Twenty-Five Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 SErON HALL J. SPORT L. 391 (1997); Diane Heckman, Woman &
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title X, 9 U. MIAMII ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1
(1992).
28 The applicable text reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... "20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1994). The act was amended in 1988 (overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555 (1984)) to clarify that the entire institution and all of its programs are subject to Title
IX's anti-discrimination requirement as long as any program within the institution accepts
federal funds. Because most educational institutions, both public and private, receive some
federal funding, virtually all colleges and universities and most secondary schools are covered,
even though that funding rarely would be going directly to the athletic programs.
29 The NCAA is the national association of colleges and universities that controls all
intercollegiate athletic competition. See http://ncaa.org.
30 Walter Byers, the NCAA executive director at that time, argued that Title IX could be
the "possible doom of intercollegiate athletics." Bart Barnes & N. Scannel, No Sporting
Chance: Girls in the Locker Room, WASH. POST, May 12, 1974, at 14A, quoted in Linda Jean
Carpenter, The Impact of Title IX on Women's Intercollegiate Sports, in GOVERNMENT AND
SPORT: THE PuBuc PoLIcY ISSuE 62, 63 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey eds., 1985).
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Tower would have exempted from Title IX all "revenue" sports, in effect
excluding football and men's basketball from the statute's reach. The Tower
Amendment failed, however, and Congress could only agree to divert the
problem elsewhere. The Javits Amendment that did pass directed the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") to prepare implementing regulations for
intercollegiate athletics, with "reasonable provisions considering the nature of
particular sports."'31
1. Defining "Separate"
The Javits Amendment resulted in Title IX's first regulations, proposed by
HEW's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") in 1974 and finalized in 1975.
Addressing the congressional mandate to consider "the nature of particular
sports," the regulations explicitly permitted the creation of sex segregated sports
teams and included the "contact sports" rule at issue in Mercer v. Duke
University. Section 106.41 of the regulations provides in relevant part:
Athletics
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any
such athletics separately on such basis.
(b) Separate Teams. Notwithstanding the requirement of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to tryout for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.
For the purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, 'wrestling, rugby, ice
hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.32
Parsing the language, the regulations thus permit separate teams, but require
an institution to allow women (as the sex with previously limited opportunities) to
try out for the men's team if there is no women's team in that sport and if the sport
31 Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974). The
Javits Amendment was part of the Education Amendments of 1974.
32 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)-(b) (2000) (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added).
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is not a "contact sport." 33 (Non-contact sports would include teams such as
swimming, tennis and golf.) In other words, women are barred from men's
"contact" sports altogether with no obligation on the part of the institution to offer
a team in that sport for women or to permit women the chance to compete for a
spot on the men's team. The provision does not require the reverse-men cannot
demand to try out for the women's team in a non-contact sport, even if there is no
men's team, because men have not been previously limited in athletic
opportunities. 34
The courts have shown little inclination to question OCR's definition of "sex
discrimination," and the application of the regulations is usually straightforward.
In Adams v. Baker,35 for example, Tiffany Adams sued to obtain a spot on her
high school wrestling team. Consistent with Title IX regulations, Adams' high
school had prohibited any girls from participating on the wrestling team. In
considering the application of Title IX, the court easily concluded that women
could be excluded under the regulations, as wrestling admittedly was a "contact
sport."'36
2. Defining "Equal"
"Separate" was thus established by the first regulations under Title IX
(permitting separate teams and protecting the men's teams from female
33 1 have assumed that women are the sex whose athletic opportunities previously have
been limited, in the language of the statute, but the reverse situation is theoretically possible at
an institution that has been exclusively or largely female in the past and thus historically has
fielded only women's teams.
34 Although one might argue the men in such a setting are being excluded from the
particular sport or team in question, courts usually have interpreted the exclusion requirement in
a more general way. Compare Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir.
1993) (debating whether athletic opportunities in general had been limited for boys), and
Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (considering
past participation in sports activities overall, not in one particular sport), with Gomes v. R.I.
Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979) (debating whether adequate
opportunities existed for boys to participate in a particular sport).
35 Adams ex rel. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1503 (D. Kan. 1996).
36 Id. The plaintiff was much more successful in her equal protection argument, however,
and the court granted her a preliminary injunction on that basis. Id. at 1505. Women excluded
from men's teams have sometimes prevailed under a Fourteenth Amendment argument in spite
of Title IX's limitations. See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
Although not an issue with regard to wrestling, litigation sometimes has proceeded on the
question of whether a particular sport not specifically listed in the regulations-such as field
hockey-can be characterized as a "contact sport." See, e.g., Williams, 998 F.2d 168 (reversing
summary judgment for male suing for opportunity to play on female field hockey team, in part
because of genuine issue of material fact as to whether field hockey is a "contact sport");
Kleczek ex rel. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991)
(considering male's suit for opportunity to play on female field hockey team).
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encroachment through the contact sports rule); what about "equal"? In 1971, the
year before Title IX was passed, girls represented only 7% of all high school
athletes--over 3.5 million boys compared to less than 300,000 girls. 37 The
regulations attempted to address this disparity by further requiring "equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes."38 Ten factors are listed for
consideration:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.39
Many of these factors are concrete. Comparing equipment and travel
allowances for the men's and women's basketball teams was a relatively easy
task under the regulations,4 although comparing equipment and practice facilities
for a volleyball team and a lacrosse team might be less clear-cut. The first factor
(addressing the issue of participation opportunities), however, offered far less
guidance. How would an institution determine if it "effectively accommodate[s]
the interests and abilities of members of both sexesr' 4
37 Nat'l Fed'n of State High School Ass'ns, 2001 High School Participation Totals, at
http://www.nfhs.orglparticipation/sportspart0l.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) (comparing
294,015 girls with 3,666,917 boys). The numbers for 2000-2001 indicate that girls now
represent 42% of the high school athletes-approximately 2.7 million girls compared to 3.9
million boys. Id The NCAA first began tracking participation numbers for intercollegiate
athletics by sex in 1984-1985 (a dozen years after Title IX's enactment and ten years after the
regulations). That year almost 300,000 students participated in intercollegiate athletics, with
women representing just under a third of the group (although national enrollment figures for
four year institutions were almost 50/50). See Athletic Participation & Student Enrollment, by
Sex, in Four-Year Institutions of Higher Education (August 1994), at
http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm#3O0.
38 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000).
39 Id
40 See generally B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and Promises to Keep: A Case Study in
Title IX, 64 U. CoLO. L. REv. 555 (1993) (comparing the budgets of the men's and women's
basketball teams at the University of Colorado at Boulder for the 1991-1992 season).
41 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2000).
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In 1979, the OCR sought to clarify the ambiguity on the participation
question by issuing a Policy Interpretation,42 purporting to explain the regulations
it had issued four years earlier. The accommodation requirement of the 1975
regulations was translated into a test offering three alternatives for compliance.
First, the institution could offer athletic opportunities "in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments. '43 In other words, if 50% of the
student body at large is female, 50% of the student athletes should be female.
Second, the institution could comply by establishing "a history and continuing
practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex." 44 Third, in an option
that does little more than restate the original standard, a school may satisfy Title
IX by demonstrating that "the interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program." 45
As a practical matter, these alternatives have been interpreted and applied by
the courts in such a way as to leave only the first alternative-proportionality-as
a legally viable option. The second alternative ("a history and continuing practice
of program expansion") may have been intended to give some breathing room to
those schools that had few women's teams in the early 1970s, but were working
towards expansion. Many schools added women's teams in the first decade of
Title IX but, in the face of tighter budgets, that era of expansion has long since
disappeared. Typical are the histories of Brown University and Colorado State
University-both high profile defendants in Title IX lawsuits in the 1990s.46 In
each case, the schools in question planned to discontinue both men's and
women's teams in order to address budget shortfalls-women's volleyball,
women's gymnastics, men's golf, and men's water polo, in Brown; women's
softball and men's baseball in Colorado State. Neither Brown nor Colorado State
had added a woman's team since the 1970s (with the exception of women's track
added by Brown in 1982). 47 Not surprisingly, the First Circuit concluded in
42 U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Title DC of the Education Amendments of 1972,
A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
43 Id. at 71,418.
44Id.
45 Id.
4 6 See Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), affd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom, Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), afid, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), remanded to
879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), affid in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
Brown was a particularly complex and lengthy case. For a more complete discussion of that
litigation and the issues raised, see Brake, supra note 26, at 50-56.
47 All of Brown's women's teams were added between 1971 and 1977, with one
exception. Colo. State Univ., 814 F. Supp. at 1514; Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. at 981. But see
Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing the history of
women's teams at Syracuse University).
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Brown that: "The very length of this hiatus suggests something far short of a
continuing practice of program expansion."48
The third possible alternative for Title IX participation compliance has
proved equally unattainable in litigation to date. Most courts have interpreted this
option as effectively eliminated by the very fact of a lawsuit. In Brown and
Colorado State, for instance, the gymnasts, volleyball players, and softball players
sued to block the elimination of their teams in the proposed cuts. If the plaintiffs
are sufficiently interested in playing these sports to litigate for that opportunity,
the courts concluded, the schools obviously were not fully accommodating their
interests.49 So far litigants and commentators' efforts to define the third
alternative more broadly have been unsuccessful.50
Thus, when the women gymnasts, volleyball players, and softball players
sued in Brown and Colorado State, only the first requirement of proportionality
remained as a compliance option. The schools had no current plans or recent
history of expansion to satisfy the second alternative-on the contrary, the cases
were prompted by the schools' decision to eliminate women's teams. The third
alternative of accommodating interests was equally unavailable in the face of a
lawsuit by the affected athletes seeking to save their respective teams. Only the
first alternative, proportionality, remained. Since neither school could establish
proportional representation, the federal court enjoined the elimination of any
women's teams.
One district court challenged the rationale but not conclusions of Brown and
Colorado State. In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,51 the court held that
the "effective accommodation of interests and abilities" remained the benchmark
of Title IX compliance, not proportionality. The case in question involved the
University's failure to offer fast-pitch softball for women. Although LSU offered
The University established five of its nine women's varsity teams in 1971-when it first
funded women's varsity sports. It dropped one of these sports (fencing) in 1972, and
replaced it with field hockey. Crew was added as a women's varsity team in 1977. Three
additional women's sports were added to the varsity roster in 1981. After 1981, no new
women's varsity team was created by the University until the addition of the varsity soccer
team in 1997. Thus, until the filing of this complaint in 1995, fourteen years passed by
without the University creating any new women's varsity teams.
Id. (citations omitted). The district court in Boucher nonetheless found that subsequent efforts to
support women's athletics satisfied the second alternative of the three-part test, but the appellate
court declined to reach the issue on appeal. Id. at 119.
48 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted).
49 Cf id at 904.
50 E.g., Julia Lamber, Gender and Intercollegiate Athletics: Data and Myths, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. RFfoRM 151 (2001); Brian V. Snow & William E. Thro, Still on the Sidelines: Developing
the Non-Discrimination Paradigm Under Title IX, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (1996).
51 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 213 F.3d 858 (5th
Cir. 2000).
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no credible evidence of the sports "interests" of its female students (through a
survey or otherwise), the court clearly suggested that such evidence might be used
to satisfy this burden in other cases.52 Given the plaintiff's strong showing of
female student interest in softball, and that the school supported a male baseball
team, the court agreed that a violation of Title IX had been established.53
In a 1996 "Clarification," OCR attempted one more time to define
nondiscrimination in the context of intercollegiate athletics. 54 The Clarification,
as described by OCR, was intended as an "elaboration" of the three-part test
included in the 1979 Policy Interpretation,55 which, in turn, had attempted to
explain the duty to "effectively accommodate" student interest required by the
1975 regulations.56 The 1996 Clarification fully embraces the three-part test but
seeks to emphasize the alternative nature of the three options. While the
proportionality test remains a "safe harbor" of compliance, OCR offers numerous
suggestions about how a university might research and monitor female student
interest under the third alternative.
OCR may well have been signaling to both schools and the courts that the
third alternative of meeting student interest should be considered a more viable
option than litigation history would suggest. Arguably none of the circuit cases
decided to date would or should have reached a different result under the
Clarification. OCR articulates yet another three-part test to evaluate the
accommodation of student interest: "(a) unmet interest in a particular sport; (b)
sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of
competition for the team."57 These factors strongly suggest that the test could not
be satisfied if the school has eliminated a women's varsity team, as in Brown and
Colorado State; OCR concedes as much.58 It seems unlikely that potential Title
5 2 Id. at 915-16.
53 Id. at 917. Curiously, however, the district court did not find that LSU had engaged in
an "intentional" violation of Title IX-a finding reversed on appeal by the Fifth Circuit.
Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 879-80 (5th Cir. 2000).
54 U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/docs/
clarific.html [hereinafter Clarification].
55 Letter from Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/docs/clarific.html (Jan. 16, 1996); see also Deborah Brake
& Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51, 69-73 (1996) (discussing the
background of the Clarification).
56 Taking a step back, one might begin to question how much deference courts should pay
to a "clarification" of a "policy interpretation" of a regulation that is now almost three decades
old.
57 Clarification, supra note 56, at 10.
58 /d. ("If an institution has recently eliminated a viable team from the intercollegiate
program, OCR will find that there is sufficient interest, ability, and available competition to
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IX plaintiffs at the intercollegiate level would even consider undertaking the
burdens of litigation absent significant athletic abilities, a commitment to their
sport, and a realistic possibility of playing competitively. Under such
circumstances, and in spite of OCR's assurances, a court may well conclude that
the interests of these women are not being effectively accommodated.
Thus, even with the 1996 Clarification, the practicalities of Title IX litigation
likely have left most schools with only one safe option-satisfying the
proportionality requirement of the first alternative. No court has seriously
questioned the authority of the regulations-or, more accurately, the "policy
interpretation" of the regulations implementing the statute. In Brown, for
example, the First Circuit afforded the regulations "controlling weight" and the
subsequent policy interpretation "appreciable deference" based on the Javits
Amendment's explicit congressional delegation of "the task of prescribing
standards for athletic programs under Title IX.' '59 The appropriateness of
proportionality as one definition of "sex discrimination" under Title IX generally
is accepted as within the agency's discretion. In a series of cases typified by
Brown and Colorado State, the federal courts repeatedly have affirmed OCR's
proportionality requirement.6° Brown, Colorado State and others have been
enjoined from eliminating women's teams when the percentage of female athletes
lags behind the percentage of women in the student body at large.
For those women seeking to protect or create a varsity women's team, the
relatively rigid but simple approach of the proportionality rule has served them
well. With minimal evidence-the percentages of male and female students and
the percentages of male and female athletes-a plaintiff can quickly (and
successfully, in most cases) establish an institution's lack of compliance under
Title IX. But for women like Heather Sue Mercer seeking to challenge the
sustain an intercollegiate team in that sport unless an institution can provide strong evidence
that interest, ability, or available competition no longer exists.").
59 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993).
60 ld. at 888; Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993); see also
Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., No. 01-3182, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18430 (6th
Cir. Aug. 7, 2002) (holding that the 1979 Policy Interpretation is entitled to "controlling
weight"); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2002) ("We conclude, as
did the [Brown] court, that the policy interpretation constitutes a reasonable and 'considered
interpretation of the regulation.' Therefore controlling deference is due it."); Boulahanis v. Bd.
of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Ci. 1999); Neal v. Rd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763,
771 (9th Cir. 1999); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aft'd, 7 F.3d 332
(3d Cir. 1993); Kelley v. Rd. of Trs. of Univ. of 1M., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. IMI. 1993), affid, 35
F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
The 1996 Clarification is the target of an action by the National Wrestling Coaches
Association against the Department of Education challenging the de facto "quota" system
allegedly imposed by Title IX's interpretation. See Christopher Flores, Wrestling Coaches Sue
Education Department Over Title IX Enforcement, CHRoN. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 1, 2002, at 39.
1120 [Vol.63:1107
underlying premise of segregation, those same regulations present a significant
barrier under the contact sports exception.
B. Heather Sue Mercer v. Duke University
Heather Sue Mercer was an experienced football player when she attempted
to join the Duke University team in 1994. As a successful soccer player and
runner, Mercer approached the football coach at Yorktown Heights High School
(New York) her senior year about trying out as a place kicker. In later news
accounts, the coach admitted his skepticism but described taking Mercer out to
the football field to see what she could do. Mercer nailed one kick after the next,
making twenty in a row even as the coach moved the ball farther and farther from
the goalposts. Mercer thus became the first female to play on her school's varsity
football team. She scored a field goal and three extra points in her very first game,
and the team went on to win the state championship. Mercer was named as the
third string All-State kicker in the state of New York. 61
Mercer enrolled at Duke University as a freshman in 1994. That fall she tried
out for the team as a walk-on. Although not added to the team, she became a team
manager and participated in conditioning drills in the spring. In April 1995,
Mercer was selected by the seniors to play in the spring scrimmage, in which she
kicked a game winning field goal. Head Coach Fred Goldsmith told reporters that
Mercer had made the team, and Mercer was told the same by the kicking coach,
Fred Chatham. The Athletic Department, apparently pleased by the resulting
media attention, asked Mercer to participate in a number of interviews. 62
In the fall of 1995, Mercer was included on the team roster and regularly
attended practices, but was not permitted to dress for home games or sit with the
team (unlike the other walk-on kickers on the team). Mercer also alleged a
number of offensive comments by Coach Goldsmith, "including asking her why
she was interested in football, wondering why she did not prefer to participate in
beauty pageants rather than football, and suggesting that she sit in the stands with
her boyfriend rather than on the sidelines." 63 (At the trial, Coach Goldsmith
testified that he did not recall using the terms "beauty pageant' and
"cheerleading," but apparently offered no categorical denial.64) In the fall of
1996, Coach Goldsmith informed Mercer that she was dropped from the team-
6 1 Lombardi, supra note 10.
62 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 645 (4th Cir. 1999). In a speech at the University
of North Carolina Law School (attended by the author), Mercer's attorney, Burton Craige,
indicated that Duke officials admitted in discovery that this was probably the most national
media attention ever directed to the Duke football team. Burton Craige, Speech at University of
North Carolina Law School (Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Craige Speech].
63 Craige Speech, supra note 64.
64 Lester Munson, A Kicker's Tale, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED FOR WOMEN, Nov.Dec. 2000,
at 26, 26.
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making Mercer the first player ever cut by Coach Goldsmith or any other Duke
football coach.65
Although Duke University competes in the highest division (I-A) of NCAA
athletics, it is not a school known for its football team. In contrast to the national
championship won by the Duke basketball team in 2000-2001, the Duke football
team lost every game of the 2000 season. The 1995 and 1996 seasons, when
Mercer sought to play, were not much better. Those teams posted records of 3-8
(1-7 in conference games) and 0-11, respectively.66 Thus, in the year Goldsmith
cut Mercer from the team, they literally could not have done any worse.
According to evidence presented at trial, the Duke football team had accepted all
walk-ons in order for the first-string players to have some competition for
practices. 67
Mercer obtained an attorney and requested an apology from Duke officials.
Her overtures were ignored, and she filed suit for sex discrimination under Title
IX.68 Duke initially argued that the claim was barred by the "contact sports" rule.
Duke contended that because it had no obligation to permit Mercer the
opportunity to try out at all, she had no right to complain about her treatment
when Duke voluntarily permitted her an opportunity not legally required. The
district court agreed and granted Duke's motion to dismiss.69
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed.70 The appellate court did not
challenge the Title IX regulations that would have allowed Duke to bar Mercer
from tryouts. After carefully reviewing the regulatory language and its structure,
however, the court concluded that subsection (a) of section 106.4171 continues to
apply as a general baseline anti-discrimination provision. If an institution chooses
to permit a woman to try out for a contact sports team, foregoing the exemption
permitted in subsection (b), the anti-discrimination requirement of subsection (a)
remains in full force. Thus, having agreed to let Mercer try out for the team, Duke
was required to treat her in a nondiscriminatory manner. Had Duke denied
Mercer a chance to try out at all, that decision would have been protected under
the contact sports exemption of section 106.41(b).72
Duke University's summary judgment was reversed, and the case returned to
the district court for trial. With a non-discrimination standard firmly in place, the
case fit nicely within the traditional discrimination paradigm. The question was
65 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 534 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
66 All-Time Results, at http://goduke.ocsn.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/fbcalltime.html
(last visited Aug. 23, 2002).
67 Craige Speech, supra note 64.
68 Munson, supra note 66.
69 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 837 (M.D. N.C. 1998).
70 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
71 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)-(b) (2000).
72 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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not whether Mercer was the best kicker on the team (she never claimed she was);
the question was whether she was treated as well as similarly situated men-in
this case, walk-on kickers.
In just over two hours, the jury returned a verdict of $1 in actual damages and
$2 million in punitive damages for Mercer. As the jury foreman later described
the decision:
She was as good as some of the men, and she was better than one guy... but
they allowed him to dress out and play on the scout team. You have one woman
who is treated differently than all the men. That ain't brain surgery.... [Ilf you
don't want her on the team, don't put her on. And if you do, you have to treat her
like anyone else.73
C. Equal Protection
In addition to the case of Heather Sue Mercer, a review of published opinions
uncovers fewer than two dozen cases in the last thirty years challenging the denial
of participation on a school team because of one's sex74---and many do not even
address Title IX. To the extent women and sometimes men have had any success
in gaining access to segregated teams, that success has been found by eschewing
Title IX altogether. Where public institutions are involved, some litigants have
avoided the contact sports exemption by relying instead on an equal protection
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment75-an attack unavailable to Mercer
73 Vicki Cheng & John Sullivan, Jurors Put Aside Issue of Ability, NEws & OBsERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 14, 2000, at IA.
74 An attempt to locate all cases involving this issue yielded twenty cases other than
Mercer. Twelve of these cases involved girls suing to access junior or high school men's teams.
See O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301 (1980) (seeking injunction to
permit junior high girl to try out for the boys' basketball team); Lavin v. ll. High Sch. Ass'n
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 527 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1975) (seeking to enjoin by-law of athletic
association prohibiting boys and girls from competing together so plaintiffs could try out for the
boys' basketball team); Morris v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973)
(enjoining as a violation of equal protection the application of a Michigan High School Athletic
Association rle that barred women from participating on non-contact sports teams with boys);
Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (enjoining as a violation of
equal protection a similar Minnesota High School League rule); Canes v. Tenn. Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (granting a preliminary
injunction on equal protection grounds to female seeking to join the high school boys' baseball
team); see also infra note 79 and accompanying text; infra note 96 (eight cases involved boys
suing to access females' junior or high school teams). While the research is not offered as
exhaustive, it is at least representative.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Adams ex reL Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496
(D. Kan. 1996) (involving a prohibition of girls from a high school wrestling team that created
an equal protection claim); Force ex rel. Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570'F. Supp.
1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D.
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because Duke University is a private institution, not a public one. These cases
typically involve junior or senior high athletes rather than intercollegiate
hopefuls. 76
Carol and Delores Dam-in had aspirations of playing football before Heather
Sue Mercer was even born. The sisters sued in 1975, along with others, to
challenge the regulations of the Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association
that prohibited girls from playing high school football. 77 The Supreme Court of
Washington agreed that such a gender classification, regardless of the students'
abilities, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An
individualized determination of qualifications was required. The court also
pointed to the Equal Protection Clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions. 78
In another early case, Pennsylvania's attorney general challenged a by-law of
the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (governing both junior and
high school athletics) banning girls from competing or even practicing against
boys in "any athletic contest."'79 The court found the provision unconstitutional on
its face under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Rights Amendment in
the Pennsylvania Constitution. Even if the school offered teams for both sexes,
the court noted, denying a talented and qualified girl the chance to compete at a
Wis. 1978) (class action challenging exclusion of girls from boys' contact and non-contact
sports teams as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hoover v. Meikeljohn, 430 F. Supp.
164 (D. Colo. 1977); Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1975); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
76 Although many claims involving intercollegiate sports have been made against public
universities, these cases typically have involved attempts by women athletes to "save" women's
teams. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1993); Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), affid in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993). Other cases
involve attempts to create women's teams. See Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113 (2d
Cir. 1999) (seeking to elevate women's lacrosse and softball club teams to varsity status);
Kiechel v. Auburn Univ., No. CV-93-V-474-E (M.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 1993) (seeking to elevate
women's club team to varsity); Sanders v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. A-92-CA-405 (W.D.
Tex. July 1, 1992) (seeking to elevate three women's club teams and one women's intramural
team to varsity status, settled on Oct. 24, 1993). These cases are not typically claims of access to
existing men's teams. The reason for this may be twofold. Frst, by college, the "best" men in
many sports are likely better than the "best" women in that sport. Thus, the opportunity to "try
out" for the men's teams on a merit basis would yield few spots for female athletes. Second,
having played segregated sports for most of their lives, many women may be uninterested in
playing on a predominately male team even if the opportunity were available. Heather Sue
Mercer is thus the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, other than the Mercer case, research
has not revealed a single other published opinion involving this issue at the college level.
77 Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
78 Id at 891-93.
79 Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 840 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975).
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potentially higher level on a boys' team could not be justified under notions of
equality.80
Donna Hoover sued to gain access to the high school boys' soccer team at a
time when there was no girls' team offered in that sport.81 The court agreed that
equal protection was at stake and rejected the rationale of the Colorado High
School Activities Association that allowing girls to play would expose them to an
inordinate risk of injury.8 2 Nichole Force was similarly successful in a lawsuit to
gain access to her eighth grade junior high football team--the court noted that
such gender classifications perpetuate "stereotypic notions" of the proper roles of
men and women.83 More recently, Tiffany Adams successfully sought a
preliminary injunction for the right to participate on her high school wrestling
team. 84
The equal protection test applicable in cases of governmental classifications
based on sex requires the defendant to justify the exclusion as "substantially
related" to an "important governmental objective." 85 In most of these cases, the
school district or athletic association attempted to meet the constitutional
challenge by asserting "safety" as the "important governmental objective"
80 Id at 842.
81 Hoover v. MeikelJohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
82 Id at 169-70.
83 Force ex reL Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (W.D. Mo.
1983).
84 Adams ex reL Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996). Although Title IX
permitted the exclusion under the contact sports exemption, see supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text, the court found a likelihood of prevailing on her equal protection argument.
85 See, e.g., Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1503 ("A party seeking to uphold a classification
based on gender carries the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification. Gender based discrimination is permissible only where the discrimination is
'substantially related' to the achievement of 'important governmental objectives."') (citation
omitted) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Force, 570 F.
Supp. at 1023-24.
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement of the test for sex classifications under
the Equal Protection Clause is found in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996),
considering the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute:
To summarize the Court's current directions for cases of official classification based on
gender Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is
sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is
"exceedingly persuasive." The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on
the State. The State must show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." The justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not
rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females.
Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
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justifying the exclusion of women from men's teams. In other words, they were
protecting these girls/women from potential injury that they might suffer from
playing "contact" sports with the boys/men. 86 Such claims often were supported
by generalized evidence or stereotypes about the size and strength of males versus
females. 87 While agreeing that safety might constitute a permissible objective in
the abstract, the courts rejected generalizations and assumptions as a basis for
excluding these particular females without any individualized assessment of their
abilities. As one court concluded, such safety arguments "suggest the very sort of
well-meaning but overly 'paternalistic' attitude about females which the Supreme
Court has viewed with such concern."88 The schools rarely made any effort to
exclude small or weak males who might also be injured in such competitions,
thus undermining their purported concerns for student safety.89
86 See, e.g., Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504; Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1503; Leffel v. Wis.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Hoover, 430 F. Supp
at 169; Carnes v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 571 (E.D. Tenn.
1976); Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975);
Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 892 (Wash. 1975). In Force, the school district also argued that
the exclusion of girls from the wrestling team would prevent sexual harassment litigation. As
with the safety justification, the court agreed that this was an important objective but found no
substantial relationship between that goal and excluding girls from the wrestling team. 570 F.
Supp. at 1023-24.
87 See, e.g., Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1500; Leffel, 444 F. Supp. at 1122.
88 Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1029; see also Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504 (quoting Force, 570
F. Supp. at 1029); Cames, 415 F. Supp. at 571.
TSSAA's [Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association] first justification [to protect
females from exposure to an unreasonable risk of harm] for its rule is questionable because
it may be drawn too imprecisely to accomplish its avowed purpose. In other words, as
applied to the facts of the present case, the rule may permit males who are highly prone to
injury to play baseball at Central High School, while, at the same time, it may prevent
females whose physical fitness would make a risk of physical harm unlikely, from
participating in the school's baseball program.
Id.
89 See Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1500; Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1020.
In short, the "safety" factor which defendants would utilize to prevent any female from
playing eighth grade football-including those who could play safely-is not applied to
males at all, even to those who could not play safely. All this tends to suggest the very sort
of well-meaning but overly "paternalistic" attitude about females which the Supreme
Court has viewed with such concern.
Id. at 1029 (citation omitted); Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169 ("I'e failure to establish any
physical criteria to protect small or weak males from the injurious effects of competition with
larger or stronger males destroys the credibility of the reasoning urged in the support of the sex
classification."); Darrin, 540 P.2d at 892 ("WlAA expressly permitted small, slightly built
young boys, prone to injury, to play without proper training to prevent injury."). But see Lafler
v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104, 106-07 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (denying injunction to
permit female boxer to compete in Golden Gloves boxing competition because of
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What one might find curious about these cases is that the courts, while
accepting these equal protection challenges, generally have not held
unconstitutional the contact sports regulation that seemingly authorized the
schools and associations in question to exclude these females in the first place.
One of the few cases to address the issue is Yellow Springs Exempted Village
School District Board of Education v. Ohio High School Athletic Association9
Yellow Springs School District actually encouraged coed teams in middle school.
Following tryouts for basketball, two girls were named to the team. Under the
Ohio High School Athletic Association ("OHSAA") rules (governing both
middle and high school athletics), however, coed teams were not permitted in any
contact sport. The school district sued to enjoin enforcement of the rule as a
violation of Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, finding that the rules of the OHSAA constituted "state action" and
holding the contact sports regulation unconstitutional. 91 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that the district was entitled to an injunction against the enforcement
of the OHSAA rule prohibiting coed teams but reversed on the unconstitutionality
of the Title IX regulations. The appellate court concluded that the regulation's
language was constitutional because it was only "permissive"-girls were not
prohibited by the regulations from competing on boys' teams.92
What about a male who wants to play volleyball or field hockey at a school
that only offers females' teams in these sports? 93 Here equal protection arguments
have been less successful, and the schools have found themselves on more secure
footing. In this context, the schools have articulated the "important govenmental
objective" of providing sports opportunities for women. Generalizations about
male versus female strength have been accepted more readily as part of the
schools' justification that men would soon dominate the girls' teams if allowed to
try out on a competitive basis.94 Brian Kleczek, for example, was denied a
dissimilarities in male and female bodies and the of use of body weight as a proxy for strength
in boxing).
Equal protection challenges to the proportionality test in the regulations also have been
unsuccessful. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
90 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981).
91 Id at 652.
92 Id. at 656.
93 Under Title IX regulations, there is no claim under § 106.41 because segregated teams
are permitted and members of the opposite sex may be excluded if the team is "contact sport"
or the individual is not a member of the previously excluded sex. See supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text. Because boys do not qualify as "the excluded sex" at most institutions, no
Title IX cause of action exists.
94 See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993);
Kleczek ex rel. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic, 768 F. Supp. 951, 957 (D.R.I. 1991)
(preliminary injunction to permit boys' access to girls' field hockey team denied); Clark ex reL
Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding
exclusion of males from all female sports teams as serving legitimate state interest); Petrie v. 111.
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preliminary injunction granting him access to the field hockey team. The court
concluded that encouraging female participation in sports was a "legitimate
objective" and the exclusion of males from those teams was substantially related
to that objective.95 A similar result was reached in Trent Petrie's legal bid to play
on his high school girls' volleyball team.9 6
D. Explaining the De Jure and De Facto Exclusion of Women From
Contact Sports
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious ... the
physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race ... she has been looked upon
in the courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved.97
United States Supreme Court, 1908
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of
gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the "proper place"
of women and their need for special protection.9 8
United States Supreme Court, 1979
In many ways, the contact sports rule is an easy target. What is the rationale
High Sch., 394 N.E.2d 855, 864 (I1. App. Ct. 1979) (upholding exclusion of boys from girls'
volleyball team); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., Cumberland Reg'l Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1064-65
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (upholding exclusion of males from all female sports teams as
serving legitimate state interest); Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458,
463-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (denying equal protection challenge to male seeking to join the
girls' high school tennis team). But see Gomes v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659
(D.R.I. 1979); Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 296
(Mass. 1979) (invalidating under the state Equal Rights Amendment a rule that prohibited boys
from playing on girls' teams).
95 Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 956.
96 Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862; cf Williams, 998 F.2d at 179-80. The Third Circuit reversed
summary judgment and remanded the male plaintiff's suit for a spot on the field hockey team.
As to Title IX issues, the court remanded for determination whether field hockey was a "contact
sport," which would bar plaintiff's participation. Id at 174. If not a contact sport, the lower
court was directed to decide whether athletic opportunities for boys had been limited. Id The
court also remanded under the (Pennsylvania) Equal Rights Amendment for determination
whether boys would eventually dominate the girls' team if allowed to play. Id at 178.
97 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to an
Oregon statute that limited the number of hours per day women were permitted to work in any
factory or laundry).
98 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (holding an Alabama statute requiring only
husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony upon divorce unconstitutional).
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under any modem notion of discrimination-Title VII and the equal protection
doctrine-for not requiring that Heather Sue Mercer be given the same
opportunity as her male classmates to try out for a position as a place-kicker?
While there is little history to explain definitively why the contact sports
"exception" was adopted, one can readily imagine at least two possibilities. First,
in response to the congressional debate that led to the compromise directive to
create the regulations,99 HEW must have understood the concern that college
football and men's basketball would be damaged or hampered in some way by a
nondiscrimination mandate that could divert funds and support from these sports.
The contact sports rule could help protect "football as we know (and love) it"
from encroachment by females. This assumption is bolstered by the questionable
inclusion of basketball in the regulation's list of "contact sports." One might argue
that basketball can hardly be described as a sport where contact is the "purpose"
or "major activity" of the game, as the regulation defines the term. 100 Indeed,
excessive contact is against the rules and constitutes a foul. 10 1 Protectionism
might also explain the regulation-drafters and proponents may have been
genuinely concerned that girls or women would suffer an unacceptable injury rate
if allowed to compete with males in sports where physical contact is regularly
expected, if not encouraged.10 2
The notion of protecting traditionally male domains deserves little discussion,
particularly in largely public arenas such as secondary schools and universities.
The fundamental premise of non-discrimination (and equal protection) is to
remove such artificial barriers. Roles reserved for men fifty years ago have long
since opened up to women. The issue of injuries may deserve a bit more attention,
but not much. If one accepts that the average female is likely to be smaller and
weaker than the average male, it may be true that some women are more likely to
be injured playing some types of sports with some men. Even if this proposition is
subject to proof, however, our definition of discrimination in other arenas has
rejected such paternalism. Statutes passed in the first half of the last century to
99 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
lo See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2000).
101 NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLEnIc ASS'N, NCAA MEN's AND WoMEN's BASKETBALL
RULEs AND INTERPRETATIONS 124 (Marty Benson ed., 2002), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/rules/2002/2002_basketballrules.pdf.
102 Compare cases cited in supra note 88, in which school districts and athletic
associations have attempted to justify the exclusion of women from contact sports by safety
concerns.
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limit women's working hours,10 3 and prohibit women from working night
shifts, 10 4 have long since fallen to equal protection challenges.
More recently, in the very context of school sports, courts have routinely
upheld equal protection claims in the face of similar arguments about safety and
protection. Twenty-five years ago, a Colorado federal district court agreed that
denying a girl the right to try out for the boys' soccer team (at a time when the
schools had no girls' soccer teams) violated our most fundamental notions of
equal protection for women:
The defendants in this case have sought to support the exclusionary rule by
asserting the state interest in the protection of females from injury in this sport.
While the evidence in this case has shown that males as a class tend to have an
advantage in strength and speed over females as a class and that a collision
between a male and a female would tend to be to the disadvantage of the female,
the evidence also shows that the range of differences among individuals of both
sexes is greater that the average differences between the sexes. The failure to
establish any physical criteria to protect small or weak males from the injurious
effects of competition with larger or stronger males destroys the credibility of the
reasoning urged in the support of the sex classification.
... To deny females equal access to athletics supported by public funds is to
permit manipulation of governmental power for a masculine advantage.
Egalitarianism is the philosophical foundation of our political process and
the principle which energizes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment The emergence of female interest in an active involvement in all
aspects of our society requires abandonment of many historical stereotypes. Any
notion that young women are so inherently weak, delicate or physically
inadequate that the state must protect them from the folly of participation in
vigorous athletics is a cultural anachronism unrelated to reality. 105
103 See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). But see People ex reL Hoelderlin v.
Kane, 139 N.Y.S. 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1913).
104 Cf Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (considering Equal Pay Act
issues resulting from a change in state law that no longer prohibited women from working on
the night shift).
105 Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977). The opinion was by
Judge Richard Matsch, now chief judge of the Colorado district and the judge who presided
over the Timothy McVeigh trial for the Oklahoma City bombing.
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Invalidating a rule prohibiting girls from practicing or competing against
boys in "any athletic contest," a Pennsylvania court similarly agreed:
The existence of certain characteristics to a greater degree in one sex does not
justify classification by sex rather than by the particular characteristic. If any
individual girl is too weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, she may, of course, be
excluded from competition on that basis but she cannot be excluded solely
because of her sex without regard to her relevant qualifications."'106
In a different context, the Supreme Court has explicitly warned that the use of
such gender classifications "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes
about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection."' 10 7
In employment discrimination law under Title VIL the Supreme Court
unequivocally concluded that the employer has no business using sex
classifications to substitute its judgment about personal safety for that of the
employee's. In International Union, UAW v Johnson Controls, Inc.,108 the
employer banned women from working on a battery assembly line because of the
potential exposure to lead and the concern that a developing fetus might be
harmed by such exposure. Whether concerned about its own potential liability or
the welfare of the employee and her child, or both, the employer was
inappropriately discriminating. The Court rejected any consideration other than
the employee's ability to perform the job in question, concluding that the
employer's facially discriminatory policy (applying only to women) could only
be justified by Title VII's narrow "bona fide occupational qualification"
("BFOQ") 0 9 defense:
Fertile women, as far as appears in the record, participate in the manufacture of
batteries as efficiently as anyone else. Johnson Controls' professed moral and
ethical concerns about the welfare of the next generation do not suffice to
106 Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975) (citation omitted); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974); see also supra
notes 87-91 and accompanying text. But see Lafler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104
(W.D. Mich. 1982).
[B]oxing uses body weight as a proxy for strength in an attempt to equalize the relative
physical capabilities of opposing boxers. The general dissimilarity in body make-up
between men as a class and women as a class would jeopardize the use of body weight for
this equalizing purpose in a unified male and female competition. Therefore these general
class characteristics are relevant to a decision regarding the status of women in boxing,
even though they might not be relevant in other sports.
Id at 107.
107 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute
requiring only husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony upon divorce).
108 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
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establish a BFOQ of female sterility. Decisions about the welfare of future
children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support and raise them
rather than to the employers who hire those parents." 0
By analogy, a woman's decision to join a football team, and the inherent risks
of injury involved, should be no different than a man's decision. She (or her
parents, if a minor) should be as free as her male teammates to accept the risks
involved.
III. THE CoAcHES: SEGREGATION SPREADS
A. Women in Coaching
Although Title IX regulations include nothing about the sex segregation of
coaches, we implicitly have accepted that men are to be coached only by men, yet
we have no problem with women being coached by men. IlI Historically, both our
teams and our coaches adhered to the sex segregation norms in sports."12 When
Title IX was passed in 1972, women coached over 90% of the college women's
teams in existence, few though there were. Title IX, however, brought teams,
attention, money, and opportunities into women's sports for the first time. Not
surprisingly, the men came too, at least for the rapidly expanding number of
coaching positions. By 1987, women were coaching less than 50% of the college
women's teams.1 13 And this dismaying trend continues, in spite of the increasing
number of women's teams. Between 1994 and 1996, for example, 209 women's
teams were added at NCAA schools, yet there was a net loss of nine female head
coaches during that same period. 14 In the last two years, women were hired for
I 10 Int'l Union, 499 U.S. at 206.
111 See generally Annelies Knoppers, Gender and the Coaching Profession, in WOMEN,
SPORTS, AND CuLTuRE 119 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl Cole eds., 1994); Cathryn L. Claussen,
Title IX and Employment Discrimination in Coaching Intercollegiate Athletics, 12 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SpORTS L. REv. 149 (1995).
112 For a story about one of the rare exceptions to this generalization, see Rick Lipsey, It's
a Woman's World Too, SPoRTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 9, 1996, at 92, discussing the experience of
Dot Murphy as a receivers' coach for the Hind's Community College football team in
Raymond, Mississippi.
113 R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A
Longitudinal Study--Nineteen Year Update 1977-2002, at http://www.smith.edu/wsc/women
in sport.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2002) (showing annual percentages of women as coaches
for women's teams, dropping from over 90% in 1972 to 44% in 2002); see also Interview by
Cheryl Corley with Linda Carpenter, Former Physical Educ. Professor at Brooklyn College
(National Public Radio Morning Edition ) (Mar. 27, 2002), available at
http://searchl .npr.org/opt/collections/torched/me/datajmetseg_-140640.htm [hereinafter
Carpenter Interview].
114 Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 115.
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only 10% of the available coaching positions for women's teams. 115 In contrast,
women fill only 2% of the head coaching positions for men's teams, and most of
these are for coed teams, such as cross country and swimming, where a single
head coach is hired. 116 No comparable national data are available for middle and
high schools, but one study of high schools in Iowa found that men held 98% of
the head coaching positions for boys' teams and 73% of the head coaching
positions for girls' teams. 117
Much of the litigation and commentary about women coaches has focused on
a related issue-the significant pay disparity between coaches of men's and
women's teams. 118 Although this disparity affects male coaches of women's
teams as well, women coaches are affected at a significantly higher rate since the
women are relegated almost exclusively to the role of coaching women's teams.
A recent survey indicates that female coaches and athletic administrators earn, on
average, only 62% of the salaries earned by their male counterparts. 19 Disparities
between head coaches at large universities with big-time programs can be much
greater. At the University of Texas, for example, the average salaries for the head
coaches of men's teams in 1998 was $291,587, compared with the average for the
head coaches of women's teams of $88,219-a difference of 230%.120 Similarly,
at the University of Florida, the disparity was 224%, $286,274 compared to
$88,325.121
Existing discrimination legislation so far has proven unequal to the task of
redressing this large gap in compensation. Courts have rejected Equal Pay Act 122
claims because, even within the same sport, the relatively rigid requirement of
"equal work" under the statute is not met. In comparing the head coaching
115 Carpenter Interview, supra note 115.
116 Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 115.
1 17 Jeff Oliphant, Iowa High Schools Athletic Gender-Equity Study Summary of Results
(June 1995), at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/getiowastudy/iowahs.html.
118 See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving the
search of a female head coach of a women's basketball team for a salary matching the salary of
the head coach of the men's basketball team); EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12,
818 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1987) (claiming that male coaches were being paid more than female
coaches in junior and high schools); Terry W. Dodds, Comment, Equal Pay in College
Coaching: A Summary of Recent Decision, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 319 (2000); Janet Judge et al., Pay
Equity: A Legal and Practical Approach to the Compensation of College Coaches, 6 SErON
HALL J. SPORT L. 549 (1996); Robert Bryce, Foul Pay, AusTN CHRON., Sept. 26, 2001,
http://www.auschron.com/issues/voll8/issue03/pols.UTcoach.html; Barbara Osborne &
Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Pay Equity for Coaches and Athletic Administrators: An Element of
Title IX?, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 231 (2000).
1 19 Welch Suggs, Uneven Progress for Women's Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7,
2000, at A52.
120 Bryce, supra note 120.
121 Id.
122 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
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positions for the men's and women's basketball team at the University of
Southern California, for example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the head coach
of the men's team had greater responsibilities due to the pressure to generate
revenue and other demands associated with a higher profile team.123 With respect
to Title VII, the different "market" for the two positions has been accepted as a
defense to justify the difference in pay.12 4 Although a full discussion of the legal
issues surrounding these salary disparities is available elsewhere 125 and beyond
the scope of this article, its very existence serves to reinforce the messages of
inferiority associated with women and their sports teams.
B. Geraldine Fuhr v. Hazel Park School District
Geraldine Fuhr apparently enjoys coaching basketball. By 1999, she had
accumulated the equivalent of twenty-eight years experience coaching high
school players-including sixteen seasons of girls' basketball (ten seasons as the
varsity coach) and twelve seasons of boys' basketball (including nine seasons as
the junior varsity coach and eight seasons as the assistant varsity coach), not to
mention her experience running various basketball tours and tournaments over the
years. 126 When the boys' varsity coach of ten years announced his retirement at
the end of the 1998-1999 season, Fuhr believed she was more than ready and
qualified for that challenge. Her only competition for the position was Barnett, a
man with only two years of coaching experience (and a record of 6-36 for the two
123 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1321. But see Brock v. Ga. Southwestern Coll., 765 F.2d 1026
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding that male coach of men's basketball had larger budget and
responsibility to arrange off-campus games, but female intramural coach had other scheduling
and budgetary duties that made the positions "substantially equal" under the Equal Pay Act);
Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that female coach
of women's basketball team successfully compared her duties and responsibilities to those of
the male coach of the men's basketball team).
124 See Enforcement Guidance: Sex Discrimination in Coaches' Pay, [Nov. 1997] EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 230, at N-3489 (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
docs/coaches.html.
The "marketplace value" defense is not gender-based but rather is based on the employer's
consideration of an individual's values in setting wages. Such consideration will qualify as
a factor other than sex only if the employer can demonstrate that it has assessed the
marketplace value of the particular individual's job-related characteristics, and any salary
discrepancy is not based on sex.
Id. at N-3495; 4 Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A compensation system that is responsive to supply and demand
and other market forces ... does not constitute a single practice that suffices to support a claim
under disparate impact theory.").
125 See Dodds, supra note 120; Judge et al., supra note 120; Osborne & Yarbrough, supra
note 120; Enforcement Guidance: Sex Discrimination in Coaches' Pay, supra note 126.
126 See Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of Hazel Park, 131 F. Supp. 2d 947, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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seasons) with the freshman boys' team. Barnett was hired. 127 Did I mention he
was a man?
Fuhr's experience alone would have made an impressive case for a claim of
sex discrimination, but it gets better. The selection committee for the new coach
was put together by the district-wide athletic director, Dan Grant.128 Hazelwood
High's athletic director-who had supervised both candidates for the position-
was put on the committee but then "uninvited" on the day of the interviews.129
The committee never consulted the former varsity coach, although he also had
worked closely with both candidates. The school superintendent, a member of the
selection committee, participated fully in Barnett's interview but left the room
minutes into Fuhr's interview.130 Hazelwood's principal, also a member of the
committee, supported Fuhr but was outvoted, her opponents citing "unspecified
'community problems' despite the principal's disputing this claim. 13 1
According to news accounts of the trial, the school district argued several
reasons for not offering the varsity coaching position to Fuhr-her record as
coach of the girls' varsity team was not compelling, there was a high turnover rate
among her assistant coaches, and the school might have a problem finding a new
coach for the girls' team if Fuhr left that position.132 (The reference to Fuhr's
record seems particularly odd given that Barnett had two dismal seasons totaling
6-36, while Fuhr's record as the junior varsity and freshmen boys' coach was 86-
34.133) The district's attorney "accused Fuhr of sexual stereotyping for
considering the boys' team a better job opportunity" and argued that hiring Fuhr
"would send the school's female athletes the message that the district favor[ed]
boys' sports." 134
The trial concluded on August 7, 2001, with judgment for the plaintiff. The
plaintiffs lawyer's only apparent mistake was her modesty in evaluating her
client's claim. Fuhr had suffered no real monetary damages because her stipend
as the head coach of the girls' varsity team was the same as the stipend she would
have earned as the head coach of the boys' team. Her attorney therefore suggested
to the all-female jury of eight that $200,000 would be an appropriate damage
award; the jury evidently disagreed and came back with an award of $455,000.135
127 See id. at 949.
128 Id at 948.
129 Id. at 949.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 E.g., Hawke Fracassa, Coach Wins Sex Bias Case, DErRorr NEws, August 8, 2001,
Sports, at 1; Helms, supra note 15.
133 Fracassa, supra note 134.
134 Helms, supra note 15.
135 Id. The trial court recently denied the district's new trial motion and awarded
attorneys' fees to Coach Fuhr in the amount of $100,000. Attorney Awarded Fees, YOUR SCH.
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Following the jury verdict, the district's attorney continued to defend its
hiring decision, reaching back to describe Barnett's successful high school career
as a player thirteen years earlier. The attorney's comments perhaps provided some
unintended insight and support for the jury's conclusion. If a juror had any doubt
about her decision, his remarks may have reassured her that gender stereotyping
was indeed at work in the hiring decision. In short, Barnett was considered "one
of the boys."
When [Barnett] played he was high school MVP, captain of the team, all-county.
He's a hotshot young fireball who is a nice role model for the 17- and 18-year-
old boys playing the game .... He works out with the guys and seems like the
right kind of person for the job.136
C. Understanding the Exclusion of Women from Coaching
The dearth of women in coaching might have once been explained by the
dearth of female athletes. With so few women competing in high school and
college in the 1960s and the 1970s, 137 and surely even fewer contemplating
coaching as a viable career option, the number of female applicants in the 1980s
and 1990s may have been limited. Research has not uncovered any available
source of applicant data that would confirm or refute such an assumption. The
NCAA has been tracking sports participation rates by sex since 1981-1982. That
year almost one-third of the intercollegiate athletes were female. 138 Seventeen
years later one might expect to see a growing number of women in coaching
positions, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the intercollegiate
coaches. Yet the trend seems to be going the other way. Women have made little
headway in coaching men's teams, and the influx of men into coaching positions
for women's teams threatens their representation in that arena as well. 139
If women are ever to be considered serious candidates for coaching men's
teams, one can hardly imagine a better case than that of Geraldine Fuhr. We
regularly see other assistants promoted to head coach when the position is
vacated. If Geraldine had been Gerald, is it likely the varsity assistant of sixteen
years-supported by both the school's principal and athletic director-would
& L. (March 13, 2002), at Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, httpJ/web.lexis-nexis.com/
universe (on file with author).
136 Fracassa, supra note 134.
137 In 1971, girls represented only 7% of all high school athletes (comparing 294,015 girls
to 3,666,917 boys). NAT'L FED'N OF STATE HIGH SCH. Ass'N, 1999-2000 ATHLETICS
PARTnCIPATION SURVEY 55, at http://www.nfls.org/part-survey99-00.htm (2000).
138 See Year-By-Year Sports Participation, in NCAA 1982-2001 SPORTS SPONSORSHIP
PARTICIPATION REPORT 9, 11-12 (2002), available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
edoutreach/gender..equity/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
139 See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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have been passed over for a ninth grade coach with two years of experience? if
we were looking for more opportunities for women in this area, Hazel Park was
presented with a golden opportunity. What would the objection have been to
Fuhr's selection other than the fact that she's a woman? Is the administration
woried that the team parents will complain? Or that the boys will refuse to play
for a woman coach?
Concerns about how the players or the parents will react to the hiring of a
female coach are easily dismissed under discrimination doctrine. The issue here
arises under Title IX and Title VII both of which would be applicable to Fuhr's
claim. Title VII law has long rejected comparable issues of "customer preference"
as a defense in employment discrimination. 140 The reaction of white students and
their parents to school integration provided no legal defense to the law's
requirement that issues of race be removed from the right to a public education.
What about the child with AIDS attending the public school?141 Or the reaction
of students and alumni when the courts ended sex segregation at the Citadel? 142
Intercollegiate athletics' existing salary inequities between coaches of male
teams and female teams reinforce the message conveyed by the absence of
women coaches for men's teams: women in sports are less qualified and less
valued. The message that women coaches are less qualified to coach male teams
and that women athletes are less valued as players is used to justify the market
decision to pay coaches of female teams, especially female coaches, less money.
Few players are likely to understand the legal conclusions about "different jobs"
under the Equal Pay Act or "different markets" under Title VII. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that female players and female sports simply are less
important.
While it may be easy to infer stereotyping and discriminatory motives to the
Hazel Park School District, few cases will be as clear cut as Fuhr's. Explanations
for the broader problem are likely more complex and less patently unlawful. 143 It
may well be that the practice of segregated coaching is so ingrained in our sports
culture that even a highly qualified female applicant would not bother to apply for
a collegiate position coaching men's teams. Male applicants for a coaching
position may legitimately claim more experience, given the limited past
opportunities for women. Even if these two factors combine to explain the current
status of women in coaching, however, they are far from satisfying. On the
140 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(aX)(iii) (2000); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the preference of male passengers cannot justify
hiring only female flight attendants).
141 See, e.g., AIDS Victim, 14, Returns to School After Two Years, TORONTo STAR, Aug.
26, 1986, at A4.
14 2 See, e.g., Catherine S. Manegold, For Citadel, Few Options Except Talk, N.Y. TWEs,
June 27, 1996, at B9.
14 3 See generally Knoppers, supra note 113, at 120-26 (discussing various factors that
may explain the relative lack of women in coaching positions).
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contrary, they return us to our starting point of the intractable problems created by
a system of sex segregation.
Most boys/men routinely interact with girls/women as classmates and
teachers. But this routine experience only serves to highlight girls'/women's
exclusion from coaching those same boys/men on the sports fields-reinforcing
the conscious and subconscious messages that sports remain a "safe zone" for
men. Women need not apply.
IV. THE DEMISE OF SCHOOL SPORTS:
THE KNIGHT COMMISSION AND THE GAME OF LIFE
The original Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, a group of
distinguished past and present university officials, 144 was created by the Knight
Foundation in October, 1989, in response to numerous scandals and growing
concerns that the world of college athletics "threatened the very integrity of
higher education."'145 Stories of NCAA rule violations (by over half of the
Division I-A schools), illegal payments to players (reported by nearly a third of
professional football players surveyed about their college experiences), and
dismal graduation rates (under 20% for men's basketball at over one third of the
Division I-A programs) were rampant.146 Time magazine described the problem
as "an obsession with winning and moneymaking that is pervading the noblest
ideals of both sports and education in America." 147 The Commission sought to
address these growing problems with a series of recommendations in its March
1991 report. 148 At the heart of its proposals was the Commission's conclusion
that university presidents must reassert their leadership and control over athletics
144The Commission was co-chaired by William Friday, former president of the
University of North Carolina, and Theodore Hesburgh, former president of Notre Dame. A
complete list of the Commission members can be found in JOHN S. & JAMES L. KNIGHT
FOUND., A Solid Start: A Report on Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, in REPORTS OF THE
KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLEGiATE ATH.ETICS 47, 54-55 (1999), available at
http://www.knightfdn.org/default.asp?story=news-at-knight/speciaLreports/coi_athletics.html
[hereinafter KNIGHT REPORT 1992].
14 5 JOHN S. & JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUND., REPORTS OF THE KNIGHT COMMISSION ON
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIcS 2 (1999), available at http://www.knightfdn.org/default.asp?
story=news-atknight/specialreports/coiathletics.html [hereinafter KNIGHT FOUNDATION
REPORTS].
14 6 Id at4.
14 7 Id. at 3.
14 8 Id The original Knight Commission actually published a series of three reports, of
which its 1991 report was the first. See KNIGHT REPORT 1991, supra note 17; KNIGHT REPORT
1992, supra note 146; JOHN S. & JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUND., A New Beginning for a New
Century: Intercollegiate Athletics in the United States, in REPORTS OF THE KNIGHT
COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLEICS 59 (1999), at http://www.knightfdn.org/
news_atknight/special-reports/KnightCommissionOnIntereollegiateAthletics.pdf.
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in order to regain "academic integrity, financial integrity, and independent
certification."' 149 Ten years later, the Commission reconvened to assess higher
education's progress in addressing these problems. In spite of much progress in
the implementation of earlier recommendations, however, the Commission could
only report that things had gotten worse instead of better.
[T]he Commission is forced to reiterate its earlier conclusion that "at their worst,
big-time college athletics appear to have lost their bearings." Athletics continue
to 'threaten to overwhelm the universities in whose name they were
established."
Indeed, we must report that the threat has grown rather than diminished.
More sweeping measures are imperative to halt the erosion to traditional
educational values in college sports. 150
For anyone who enjoys intercollegiate athletics, the 2001 Knight
Commission report is depressing, if not devastating. Although the Commission
attempts (largely in vain) to infuse some sense of optimism into its findings, the
phrases that linger leave little room for hope: "the condition of big-time college
sports has deteriorated"; 151 "more than half the institutions competing at the top
level continue to break the rules"; 152 athletics are "rightly characterized as 'an
entertainment industry' that is not only the antithesis of academic values but is
'corrosive and corruptive to the academic enterprise"; 153 "the problem is a
prevailing money madness"; 154 "graduation rates for athletes in football and
basketball at the top level remain dismally low";155 "[a] frantic, money-oriented
modus operandi that defies responsibility dominates the structure of big-time
football and basketball"; 156 "some thirty college football and men's basketball
coaches are paid a million dollars or more a year"; 157 "the big business of big-
time sports all but swamps those values [of higher education]"; 158 "[sports
programs] answer not to the traditional standards of higher education but the
whims and pressures of the marketplace"; 159 "it is not the integrity of
149 KNIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTS, supra note 147, at 10.
150 KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 11.
151 Id at 12.
152 Id. at 12.
153 Id at 13.
154 Id. at 14.
155 Id at 15.
156 KNIGHT REPORT 2061, supra note 7, at 17.
157 Id at 18.
158 Id at 21.
159 Id at 14.
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intercollegiate sports that will be held up to question, but the integrity of higher
education itself." 160
The report proceeds to identify the three major issues of "academic
transgressions, a financial arms race, and commercialization" in the "widening
chasm between higher education's ideals and big-time college sports."'161
Graduation rates are bad and in some cases getting worse. The 970 members of
the NCAA brought in over $3 billion last year-but spent $4.1 billion.162 The big
programs have sold out at every level-to television, to equipment manufacturers,
to the world of professional sports.
The report is depressing and overwhelming. The solutions offered are
aspirational-providing student athletes the same rights and responsibilities as
other students, requiring institutional oversight and control of athletic department
budgets, and wresting control away from television and corporate interests. 163 All
are worthy goals, but one is left wondering if these suggestions-arguably only
elaborations on the Commission's 1991 recommendations-can possibly be any
more effective that those of ten years ago.
James Shulman and William Bowen, with the Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation, offer extensive data to support their own similar findings in The
Game of Life: College Sports and Educational Values,164 also published in 2001.
In a theme that would be echoed in the Knight Commission report just a few
months later, the authors described their studies as being "as much about
educational values and the missions of these institutions as it [was] about
sports." 165 The authors' research involved an in-depth study of thirty public and
private institutions at various levels within the NCAA hierarchy (ranging from
Division m at the lowest level to Division I-A representing the highest level
programs). The study included a wide spectrum from Yale to Miami University
(Ohio), from Columbia to Bryn Mawr, from Swarthmore to the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 66
The findings of Shulman and Bowen cover a broad range of issues in college
160 Id. at 31.
161 Id. at 14.
162 KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 17.
163 Id. at 26-29.
164 SHumMAN & BOwEN, supra note 22.
165 Id at xxviii.
166 The full list includes eight private Division I-A schools (Duke, Georgetown
(basketball only), Northwestern, Rice, Stanford, Tulane, Notre Dame, and Vanderbilt); four
public Division I-A schools (Miami (Ohio), Pennsylvania State, University of Michigan, and
University of North Carolina); four Division I-AA Ivy League schools (Columbia, Princeton,
Pennsylvania, and Yale); three Division III universities (Emory, Tufts, and Washington
University in St. Louis); seven Division IMI coed liberal arts colleges (Denison, Hamilton,
Kenyon, Oberlin, Swarthmore, Wesleyan, and Williams); and four Division I women's
colleges (Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Smith and Wellesley). Id.
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sports, and there is far too much information to be summarized here. Some of the
findings are positive. In looking at the careers of intercollegiate athletes after
college, for example, the authors report higher earnings for former male athletes
compared to their non-athlete peers. 167 Football and men's basketball
notwithstanding, most athletes have a very high graduation rate across the wide
spectrum of schools and sports studied. 168 But some of the carefully collected
data defies many of the myths surrounding college athletics. Reinforcing the
conclusions of the Knight Commission, Shulman and Bowen found that most
schools in their study lose money in their athletic programs, even at the highest
levels. "[I]t is unlikely that any school comes close to covering its full costs if
proper allowances are made for the capital-intensive nature of athletics." 169 Only
a few of the biggest programs break even, and then only if their teams win
consistently. 170 And contrary to popular belief, winning football teams generally
do not translate into more generous alumni giving and support.' 71
Whether part of the Ivy League or the Big Ten, schools at all levels of
competition are sending the message that athletic talent may be a more efficient
road to admission than good grades. Athletes enjoy a substantial statistical
admissions advantage. At one non-scholarship school studied, male athletes had a
48% greater chance of being admitted than their non-athlete colleagues with
similar credentials. Female athletes enjoyed a 53% advantage. 172 And, sadly,
even controlling for the differences in pre-college test scores and credentials,
athletes generally under-perform as students compared to their non-athlete
counterparts.173
In conclusion, Shulman and Bowen note the widening gap between the world
of intercollegiate athletics and the institutions to which they are only tenuously
attached:
A major unifying theme of this study is that an ever larger divide has opened up
between two worlds. One is an ever more intense athletics enterprise-with an
emphasis on specialized athletic talent, more commercialization, and a set of
norms and values that can be seen as constituting a culture of sports. The other is
the core teaching-research function of selective colleges and universities, with its
own increasing specialization, a charge to promote educational values such as
learning for its own sake, and a strong sense of obligation to provide educational
opportunity to those who will make the most of it---all in a time when the good
of the society is increasingly dependent on the effective development and
167 IL at 95-96, 263.
168 Id at 261.
169 Id at 267.
170 SHU.mAN & BOWEN, supra note 22, at 267.
171 Id at 266.
172 Id at 260.
17 3 Id at 261-62.
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deployment of intellectual capital. This widening athletic-academic divide-its
pervasiveness and subtlety - is the core of this book's message.1 74
Shulman and Bowen offer their own recommendations for change, albeit
often in even less concrete terms than the Knight Commission.1 75 They seek,
however, like the Knight Commission, to "reinvigorate the contribution of
intercollegiate athletics to the achievement of educational goals."' 176
V. SOLUTIONS
A. In Search of Gender Equity
If we forget the legal parameters for a moment (and further ignore any who
feel that certain sports should only be played by members of a particular sex),
could we even agree on a perfect sports world in equality terms? Such non-
discriminatory utopias are more easily imagined in other arenas-school
admission and hiring decisions that are merit-based and occur in a world where
women and minorities have not been burdened by socialization, economic, and
educational disadvantages. Merit-based, gender-blind decisions are unlikely to
work as well or at all in sports, even if we could hypothetically remove cultural
and economic factors that may limit women's development and opportunities in
sports.
The commentators struggling with these questions have suggested almost
every combination imaginable. The contact sports rule, predictably, is a frequent
target177-its elimination would have given Heather Sue Mercer the right to
compete for a spot on the football team. More extensive proposals include
opening all teams to both men and women based on "merit" tryouts, 178 creating a
17 4 Id. at 268-69.
175 Shulman and Bowen offer nine propositions for consideration: (1) understanding and
addressing the "growing gap between college athletics and educational values;" (2) reducing
"blatant abuses" of the rules; (3) decreasing the emphasis on high profile sports; (4)
consideration of more "far-reaching modifications" by non-Division I-A schools; (5)
eliminating scholarships in the lower profile sports; (6) "'rebalancing' the emphasis on athletics
outside the big-time programs"; (7) acting in concert to achieve significant change; (8) using
Title IX to "rethink the organization and place of college sports" rather than replicating the male
model; and (9) establishing "a clear sense of direction and strong leadership from trustees [and]
presidents." Id at 294-307.
176 SHuLMAN & BOWEN, supra note 22,at 294.
177 See, e.g., Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption: Gender
Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 381 (2000); Note, The Scope of Title IX
Protection Gains Yardage as Courts Continue to Tackle the Contact Sports Exception, 10
SEON HALLJ. SPORT L. 415 (2000).
178 See, e.g., Karen L. Tokarz, Separate but Unequal Education Sports Programs: The
Need for a New Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 201, 244 (1985). Tokarz
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model where women athletes would be equally valued in a program that included
men's teams, women's teams, and coed teams;179 adding women's football; 180
treating all sports as "teams" with male and female components (similar to the
Olympics); 181 maintaining sex segregated teams, but requiring schools to offer
any contact sport requested by a female student; and providing the resources to
determine if there is adequate interest to field such a team.182
None of the options are particularly satisfying. Eliminating the contact sports
rule seems an easy step forward-just not a very big one. The practice has already
fallen to equal protection challenges in many school districts at the pre-college
level. At a minimum, Heather Sue Mercer and those who follow should have a
right to participate in merit-based tryouts for football or baseball or any other
sport currently reserved for men. It seems so very little to ask, and so consistent
with our understanding of discrimination theory in virtually all other arenas, that
the only surprise is that the contact sports exclusion continues to exist at all.
But what seems like an easy answer for football and Mercer raises a number
of other complex questions: Would men similarly be permitted to try out for
women's teams where no men's team was offered? If so, would there be any limit
on the number of spots--to prevent the possibility that men would ultimately
come to dominate the women's teams as well and thus diminish athletic
opportunities for females? 183 What about a female athlete who would rather play
on the men's team than the women's team in the same sport? 184 For example, a
highly skilled female soccer or basketball player in middle school might believe
that the boys' teams are more competitive--or even want a chance to play on
both teams if the seasons do not overlap (as is often true in soccer, where boys'
recognizes, however, that women's sports opportunities likely would be limited by such a
proposal, at least in the short run. To address this concern, her proposal also permits some
women-only teams as a form of "affirmative action" for some period of time. Id. at 206, 244-
45.
179 Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1043,
1058 (1987); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279,
1296-97 (1987).
180 Rodney K. Smith, Solving the Title IX Conundrum With Women's Football, 38 S.
TEx. L. REv. 1057 (1997).
181 Marcia Federbush, An "Olympics" Approach: A More Equitable Approach to
Athletics than Title IX Offers, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 270 (2001). Federbush further
proposes coed teams, "[w]here the sexes can compete on equal footing." Id. at 271.
182 Brake, supra note 26, at 140.
183 See supra note 96-98 and accompanying text.
184 See O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1980). A sixth
grade female junior high student sued for the chance to try out for the boys' basketball team,
even though a girls' team was available. The district court "found that the separate programs
offered by the defendants were not in fact equal because Karen's opportunity to compete with
persons of substantially lesser skill in the girls' program was not as valuable as the opportunity
to compete with those who are of equal or superior skill in the boys' program." Id.
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soccer may be a fall sport, while women's soccer is a spring sport). Assuming the
girls in question are sufficiently skilled to earn these positions on a competitive
basis, what is the argument for excluding them? 18 5
Moving to "merit" tryouts for all teams would take a step beyond just
allowing women to compete on men's contact sports teams. While the proposal
has a superficial egalitarian appeal, it has been widely rejected because of the
assumption that most teams would end up with few or no women.186 Generally,
the physiological distinctions between men and women will assert themselves by
high school and certainly college. While we surely are long past any assumptions
about "all" boys being superior athletes compared to "all" girls, it is nonetheless
likely that any football, basketball, or track team selected based on competitive
tryouts would be largely, if not exclusively, male. 187 So simply supporting one
team with open tryouts, even in a large number of sports, would result in far fewer
sports opportunities for women. The idea of "tryouts and offering teams on
request" also ignores the reality of most big intercollegiate programs. These teams
are largely determined in advance through recruiting-not selected from the
"pool" of students who might attempt to try out as walk-ons.
What about requiring schools to field both men's and women's teams in any
sport offered, including the traditionally "male" sports such as football or
wrestling? This would insure that both men and women get the opportunity to
play the same games, but avoid the displacement of women by their sometimes
bigger and stronger male classmates. But the subtle and not-so-subtle distinctions
that currently exist would no doubt continue. We already have both men's and
185 Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975).
Even where separate teams are offered for boys and girls in the same sport, the most
talented girls still may be denied the right to play at that level of competition which their
ability might otherwise permit them For a girl in that position, who has been relegated to
the "girls' team," solely because of her sex, "equality under the law" has been denied.
Id
186 See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1981) ("When considering the constitutionality
of Title IX and its regulations, a blanket requirement of one team at each age level might result
in male dominance of all teams and cause a return to pre-Tile IX conditions, a result
completely at variance with the statute's purpose."). See also the cases cited at supra note 94.
187 Not all observers agree with this conclusion, however. Jennifer Hargreaves, at the
Roehampton Institute in London, has written extensively on the sociology of women's sports.
She points to research that women's performance rates in many sports are improving at a
significantly higher rate than men's, suggesting that the widely accepted differences in sex may
be based more on socialization than biology. See JENNIFER HARGREAVES, SPORTING FEMALEs:
CRrrlCAL IssuEs IN THE HISTORY AND SoCioLOGY OF WOMEN'S SPORTs 284-88 (1994).
Hargreaves goes on to argue that we define sports in ways that advantage men (i.e., speed and
strength) rather than in ways that might advantage women (e.g., flexibility and endurance). Id
at 286.
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women's basketball, and in most institutions the women's team remains the less
favored "stepchild" in a variety of ways.
Most of these proposals for equality, like the efforts of the Knight
Commission, ultimately do little more than tinker at the margins, missing the core
of the problem. We need to create instead something so different from the current
model that it allows athletics to be rejoined with the educational values that
should be the driving force behind their place in the institution.
This article proposes the elimination of segregation. Separate will almost
never be equal, so eliminate separate. All teams would be half male and half
female, including football, baseball, volleyball, field hockey, and every other
sport traditionally associated with one sex or the other--a concept not so very
different from the current use of proportionality to establish Title IX
compliance.188 The need to regulate playing time would be an obvious problem
-otherwise one could readily envision a basketball team of seven girls and seven
boys where the girls spend most of their time on the bench. Not only would half
the team need to be female, but half of the players on the court or field at any
given time must also be equal. 189
With respect to those sports in which the athletes compete as "individuals,"
such as wrestling, gymnastics, track, tennis, and swimming, separate men's and
women's events or heats could still be offered. The events should be identical for
each sex, however, and "team" performance would be determined by combined
scoring. A similar model already exists in a few NCAA-sponsored sports, such as
skiing and riflery. 190 This model acknowledges that the best men in at least some
of the sports are likely to be stronger and faster than the best women. By
competing only against other women, the female athletes will have a realistic
chance of competing successfully in any individual race or match, thus enjoying
the personal satisfaction of winning their own race. Because the school can only
succeed with strong competitors who are both male and female, however, the
combined scoring also provides incentives for athletes of both sexes to recruit and
encourage their teammates.
188 See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text. For those schools that are
predominantly one sex or the other (e.g., Wellesley, Smith, etc.), the NCAA could continue to
sponsor same sex team competitions in separate leagues or divisions. The percentage threshold
should be set at a high level, however, as a prerequisite. This would ensure that the vast
majority of NCAA competition would involve only coed teams.
189 Of course, many team sports require an odd number of players on the court or field. In
such instances the number of male or female players would not be allowed to outnumber the
other sex by more than one person at any given time, e.g., three and two in basketball, six and
five in soccer, etc. This approach is not uncommon now in the context of some club sports.
190 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLEnc ASS'N, 2002 NCAA MEN'S AND WOMEN's SKUNG
RuLES 12 (2002), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/nilest2002/2002_skiingrules.pdf
(last modified May 1, 2002) ('"'he final score of a team in the meet shall be the sum of the
points earned in each of the events.").
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Before dismissing this proposal out of hand, consider the possible
advantages. Coed teams would ensure equal opportunity in many of the ways that
currently elude Title IX enforcement-the quality of coaches, attention from the
press and the public, facilities, equipment, practice times, etc. All sports offered
would be available to both men and women, and all players within any given
sport would be receiving identical benefits (or the lack thereof). Issues would
remain about how basketball is treated compared to tennis or track, but the issues
would no longer have a gender component. College sports could be redefined as
something other than farm teams for the pros and focus instead on the educational
values and opportunities that once justified their place in our educational
institutions.
B. Point--Counterpoint
Virtually every male (and some females) who has listened to my proposal for
mandatory coed athletics has responded with some version of "but you can't do
that" or "it won't work!" There are, indeed, a number of consequences one might
anticipate from implementing such a proposal.
1. Girls Playing Football?
Where will a school find girls to play football? Some are already out there, in
spite of the current legal and cultural barriers. According to the National
Association of State High School Associations, 779 girls played high school
football in the fall of 2000, and the National Football League reports that 1.3
million girls competed in its annual Punt, Pass, and Kick competition last year.191
In fact, a professional women's football league already exists; the National
Women's Football League was formed in August 2001.192 Currently the League
has grown to twenty-eight teams overall, including expansion teams. 193
Semiprofessional teams are also springing up. 194 The 2002 season championship
drew 5,000 fans, and future games will be televised on the new Football Network
beginning in 2003.195
Underlying the push for increased athletic opportunities for women at the
intercollegiate level---even before large numbers of girls participated in school or
191 Ned Barnett, No Game for Sissies: Women's Team Loves Smashmouth Football,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 4,2001, at 1C.
192 See National Women's Football League History, at http://www.nwflcentral.com/
history.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
193 See id
194 Barnett, supra note 193 (reporting on the Carolina Cougars, a semiprofessional
women's football team out of Kemersville, N.C.).
195 See The Football Network, in Multi-Year Pact to Cover National Women's Football
League!, at http://www.nwflcentral.com/news.cfm?lD=- 3&action=spec (Sept. 5, 2002).
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club teams-was the belief that such opportunities would promote interest in
athletics among younger girls. Under this theory, the players and skills would
develop and catch up to the opportunities available over time:
[T]he creation of additional athletic spots for women would prompt universities
to recruit more female athletes, in the long run shifting women's demand curve
for sports participation. As more women participated, social norms discouraging
women's participation in sports presumably would be further eroded, prompting
additional increases in women's participation levels. 196
Many observers would agree that soccer is the hottest thing going in
women's sports, but the number of women playing soccer twenty-five years ago
was quite low. Given the growing interest among women in playing football,
without such opportunities, it seems just as likely that the same theory could work
here. And at the college level, the chance to play football would also mean access
to the dozens of scholarships that accompany those positions. With the
opportunity to play football comes many of the same benefits (however one may
define them) that have prompted boys to play the sport. 197
What if these assumptions are wrong? When the middle school holds tryouts
for football, only three girls show up. If only three girls showed up for tryouts,
there would be no football team that year. 198 Or, more likely, as happens now
with same sex teams in similar circumstances, those interested in playing would
immediately begin recruiting female classmates to join them. The boys simply
cannot play or win without the girls. Girls whose passion is volleyball or field
hockey may be facing the same challenge in reverse. Their own dreams of athletic
achievements are on the line if boys cannot be persuaded to join them.
Because filling the football slots at the college level could be particularly
difficult if implemented immediately, a multi-year "phase-in" might be
appropriate. 199 For example, coed football teams could be mandated first at the
middle/junior high school level. Three years later, the mandate would apply to
high schools. Three years after the high school mandate, colleges and universities
would be included. This would allow time for girls to become interested in and
develop some experience with the game.
19 6 Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763,768 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999).
197 The exception to this statement may be the chance to play professional football--an
incentive that presumably drives many young male athletes, unrealistic though it may be. I
would not expect the nature of professional football to change, thus those opportunities are
likely to be more limited for women.
198 The proposal is too drastic to permit exceptions or opportunities for excuses; indeed,
any exceptions might suggest this new sports concept is some version of its predecessor.
199 Immediate implementation for most other sports should not encounter the same
problems.
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2. The Women Will Get Hurt
The issue of potential injuries is of serious concern and may have been at
least part of the original justification for the contact sports exemption. 2° ° It is
surely true that the biggest and strongest men now playing college football are
generally bigger and stronger than the biggest and strongest women who are
likely to be recruited to join them on a coed team. My proposal does not ignore
this reality; on the contrary, the mandatory 50/50 ratio required on the field or
court is a consequence of it. Adding women to the teams may well increase both
the number and severity of injuries in the game.
There are a variety of responses to this concern. First, one could question the
legitimacy of such a paternalistic argument. As discussed earlier, such rationales
have been soundly rejected in other arenas such as Title VIl and equal protection.
Surely many women will choose not to play because of the risks involved, just as
many men choose not play. But this is their decision, not the school's or the
state's. Women regularly are injured in the sports they now play, but we have not
considered eliminating those opportunities as a result. Nor has there been serious
consideration of eliminating football in spite of the significant, and occasionally
even fatal injuries sustained by the males who now play.201 While such incidents
may spur discussions of safety precautions, the teams have continued to play.
If the number and severity of injuries do increase, we may be encouraged to
rethink the game and how it is played. Football is a brutal sport and many of its
former stars report that they can barely move as a result.20 2 Legendary
quarterback Johnny Unitas (Baltimore Colts) was unable to close his once famous
right hand around a button, a comb, or a fork.203 Running-back Earl Campbell
(Houston Oilers) at only forty-six is unable to grip with his hands or bend his
knees---climbing stairs requires dragging himself using his forearms on the
railings.204 Offensive lineman Joe Jacoby (Washington Redskins) at forty-one is
unable to bend over to put on socks or lace up his shoes.205 According to a 1990
survey of former players commissioned by the National Football League Players
Association, almost two-thirds reported suffering a major injury while playing-
200 See supra notes 88, 104 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., Associated Press, Fatal Injuries Rising in High School Ranks, RECORD
(Chapel Hill, N.C.), April 7, 1987, at D08 (reporting eleven football-related deaths in 1986);
Football-Related Deaths on Increase, Study Says, WASH. PosT, August 7, 1996, at B2
(reporting nine football related deaths in 1995).
202 William Nack & Lester Munson, The Wrecking Yard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 7,
2001, at 60.
203 Id at 66.
204Id. at 69.
205 Id at 70.
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"major" being defined as any injury requiring surgery or missing at least eight
games.20 6
If sports in general and football in particular are deemed a legitimate and
valuable part of a school's educational mission, surely the value of that activity is
diminished any time a student is seriously injured. We expect our schools to make
their activities as safe as possible in every other arena, and we surely would
demand that a school discontinue any extracurricular activity that proved
inordinately risky. Protective gear and various rule changes have been added to
the game of football over the years to reduce the risks of injury. The rate of
catastrophic injuries for high school football players, for example, prompted the
rule that now prohibits players from blocking and tackling head-first.207 If
additional rule changes are triggered by coed teams, there is ample precedent.
At the intercollegiate level, some fans may equate less brutal or less physical
to less "fun" or enjoyable to watch. The fans' entertainment preferences should
hardly be driving our decisions-that is how much of the problem of
professionalism in intercollegiate athletics developed in the first place. If sports
are to be re-anchored to the educational mission of the institution, the welfare of
the students will be paramount. Any decisions about the rules or nature of the
game will be that much easier because our goals will be less conflicted and better
grounded in the educational mission that justifies the enterprise.
3. Coed Teams Will Change the Nature of the Sport
Perhaps the requirement that traditionally male sports be played with half
women will ultimately prompt changes in the rules or styles of play--perhaps to
lessen the number of injuries, as just discussed, or to take advantage of the
physiological strengths (such as flexibility and endurance) that women may bring
to the game. As suggested by one commentator,
[M]ost sports have evolved as "men's sports." The sports that are most popular
-- contact sports-are sports that have been developed by men, for men. ...
Women on the other hand will be at a natural disadvantage; not because of their
biological weakness, but because sports are suited to men's strength-sports
[sic] very purpose is to exploit and exhibit men's strengths. Thus, men are not
more suited for sports, the contact sports are more suited for men. If this is true,
then the question is whether we ought to expect women to accommodate
themselves to a sport that has been suited for men's strengths, or whether the
sport ought to be accommodated to better suit women's strengths. 20 8
206 Id. at 62.
207 Catastrophic Injuries in Prep Football Drop, CAPrrAL TIMEs (Madison, Wis.), May 5,
1993, at lB.
208 Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9
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As noted earlier, the long-term effects of football injuries are staggering and
unacceptable. 2°9 Fewer injuries would benefit all student athletes, male and
female. If adjustments are made in the style of play to limit injuries, accommodate
differences, and maximize all players' opportunities to excel, that consequence
alone could model some of the educational values the institution purportedly is
attempting to emulate.
4. One Team Per Sport Will Mean Fewer Playing Opportunities
Another expressed concern may be the potential of fewer playing
opportunities for both men and women, thus "hurting" everyone. Such a concern
visualizes that an institution would generally offer the same sports now being
offered, but each sport would have only one coed team. Thus, half of the men
now playing football would lose their positions, half of both men and women
basketball players, etc. There are a variety of responses to such a concern,
depending on what values are controlling the decisions.
First, it would be possible to maintain the total number of slots for student
athletes (although probably reapportioned between men and women, which Title
IX theoretically demands in any event). This could be accomplished by some
combination of increasing NCAA squad sizes in most sports other than football
(e.g., permitting 18 or 20 players for basketball, instead of the thirteen or fifteen
currently allowed in men's and women's basketball, respectively 210) and adding
more sports. Even without adding sports, such a proposal may well "save"
opportunities for male athletes in non-revenue sports such as wrestling and
swimming-sports that are often eliminated in the name of Title IX to increase
the proportion of women athletes by reducing the number of male participants. 211
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 321, 346 (1998); cf Ruth Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities
Selection Devices for Traditionally Male Occupations as Gender-Based Employment
Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 761, 771 (1986) ("[N]ot only do courts exaggerate the
differences between men and women, implying for instance that no woman could run as fast as
any man, but they consider only those physical traits traditionally valued by men.").
209 See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text. I
2 10 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLErlc Ass'N, NCAA 2002-03 DiVISION I MANUAL 190-
91 (2002), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/divisionji-manual/2002-
03/Al5.pdf.
211 See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., No. 01-3182, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18430 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2002) (eliminating men's soccer, tennis, and wrestling teams in
order to achieve Title IX compliance); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir.
2002) (involving elimination of men's wrestling to improve women's athletic participation
rate); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284
(2000) (eliminating men's soccer and wrestling teams); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill.,
832 F. Supp. 237 (D. IM. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the elimination
of men's, but not women's swimming team is permissible under Title IX); Bill Pennington,
More Men's Teams Benched as Colleges Level the Field, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 2002, at AI
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The problem evaporates when a school is no longer struggling to balance the
large number of men currently on the football squads. Adding sports, however,
requires more coaches and facilities and may not be a financially realistic (or
wise) option.
Assume that a school is unwilling to add more sports to the roster and the
consequence is, indeed, fewer slots for student athletes-particularly male student
athletes. Characterizing this as a decision to "take away" positions from the male
athletes suggests a false sense of entitlement--the real question is of allocation
based on the institution's educational values. When the cost of the athletic
program is examined, the school may well conclude that the money is better spent
elsewhere. Even at the Ivy League schools studied by Shulman and Bowen,
where sports occupy a much less prominent role than at the Division I-A schools,
the institutions spent an average of $8,000 per year on each athlete, while
spending only $2,000 to $3,000 each year per student on all other student services
combined. 212 In some of the Division I-A programs, universities may spend over
$100,000 per player in football alone.213 Does such disparity make any sense as
an investment and allocation of limited resources?
Such findings should convince us that colleges and universities at all levels
allocate a disproportionate amount of money to their sports programs. If a
consequence of coed sports is fewer teams, fewer athletes, and a reduction in the
money spent on intercollegiate athletics, the appropriate description is a
reallocation of limited resources directed by the education mission of the
institution-replacing the escalating and unjustifiable arms race intercollegiate
athletics has become.
But what about the athletes who have lost the chance to play intercollegiate
sports due to the reduction in team spots available? Not a single student would be
barred from playing football, basketball, or baseball under a regime of coed
teams. Virtually all Division I-A schools have extensive intramural programs
where all comers are welcome. These students are deprived, not of the chance to
play, but of the high-priced accoutrements that money can buy: millionaire
coaches, carpeted locker rooms, and the latest in equipment and uniforms, to
name a few. But almost anyone has the opportunity to play-it is just that the love
of the game is no longer what it is all about.
With only half of the current spots open for football and men's basketball, are
the excluded athletes being deprived of their shots at the pros? Professional
("Since the passage 30 years ago of the law commonly known as Title IX, more than 170
wrestling programs, 80 men's tennis teams, 70 men's gymnastics teams and 45 men's track
teams have been eliminated .... "); Thomas Stinson, Dying: Men's College Gymnastics Title IX
Victims, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 8, 1995, at F2 ("'The 1972 passage of Title IX, improving
opportunities for women, began a downward trend for non-revenue-producing men's teams in
many sports.").
212 SHULMAN & BOwEN, supra note 22, at 275-76.
213 KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 17.
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athletics should not be directing the course of intercollegiate athletics. Indeed, one
of the purposes of the proposal is to eliminate, or at least diminish, that link that
seems to chive all else in top-level intercollegiate athletics. Even if one were
concerned about career opportunities in sports for the best athletes, those
individuals should be unaffected by the proposal. As noted by the Knight
Commission, a mere 1-2% of college athletes make it into professional sports.214
Those select few who have any hope of playing professionally almost certainly
will be included in the spots remaining on coed teams at the college level in any
event. Higher education should have little interest in supporting the delusions of
the rest. On the contrary, those students are better off understanding sooner rather
than later that their dreams of the future should be focused on their education
rather than their time on the field.
5. Fewer Scholarships Mean Fewer Educational Opportunities
What about the scholarships that will be lost? Would the move to coed teams,
by reducing the total number of athletes, limit the educational opportunities of
many talented athletes? Almost any school would welcome more scholarship
dollars to distribute. Nothing in the concept of coed sports requires a reduction in
institutional financial aid; instead, those now available scholarship dollars may be
awarded on some basis other than athletic talent.
If we suspend reality for a moment and consider athletic scholarships as an
investment in the education of selected students, the investment has shown a
dismally poor return in the high profile sports. As documented by Shulman and
Bowen, intercollegiate athletes generally are less academically qualified than their
counterparts in the rest of the student body, and the gap is growing, particularly in
football and men's basketball. 215 And the graduation rate for those high profile
sports is falling. According to the Knight Commission:
The historic vital link between playing field and classroom is all but severed in
many institutions. Graduation rates for athletes in football and basketball at the
top level remain dismally low--and in some notable cases are falling ... The
most recent NCAA graduation rate report reveals that 48 percent of Division I-A
football players and 34 percent of men's basketball players at Division I-A
institutions earned degrees.2 16
2 14 Id. ("Approximately 1 percent of NCAA men's basketball players and 2 percent of
NCAA football players are drafted by NBA or NFL teams--and just being drafted is no
assurance of a successful professional career.").
215 SHuLMAN & BOWEN, supra note 22, at 260-62.
216 KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 15.
1152 [Vol. 63:1107
FIFTY/FIFTY
Even in the low-profile sports, where graduation rates are higher,217 the
growing trend is that these students under-perform compared to other students,
based on their pre-collegiate predictors.218
One has difficulty imagining a university continuing, without serious re-
examination, any other scholarship program in which only a third to a half of the
recipients graduated or consistently performed in the bottom third of the class. If
it is, in fact, educational opportunities that concern us, surely these scarce
resources are better spent on students more likely to succeed and more likely to
graduate.
6. No One Will Watch and Revenues Will Suffer
Will the fans watch coed sports? If intercollegiate athletic programs were
designed to sell tickets and make money, most would have shut down long ago.
According to the recent report of the Knight Commission only about 15% of the
top college and university athletic programs operate in the black.219 Shulman and
Bowen reach a similar conclusion and further hypothesize that "it is unlikely that
any school comes closest to covering its full costs if proper allowances are made
for the capital-intensive nature of athletics."220 All that big money we associate
with college sports does not even pay the bills at most institutions, let alone make
money for other uses.
The numbers presented by the Knight Commission and Shulnan/Bowen
represent the entire athletic program budgets, however. Some data would indicate
that football and men's basketball standing alone are profitable enterprises at
many schools.221 Why not then limit our sports programs to only those two
sports? Presumably, the answer is that intercollegiate sports programs serve
purposes other than making money. Other values are at stake, including gender
equity.
Perhaps the fans will be so appalled by the idea of women playing football at
all, let alone replacing half the men on the team, that they will cancel their season
tickets and refuse to come. Perhaps the television networks will decide not to
televise these contests. But both seem unlikely in the long run. If college sports
are coed sports, the fans likely will adjust and follow their favorite teams with as
much enthusiasm as they did their segregated predecessors. As long as all teams
are operating under the same rules, the games should continue to be as exciting
and as competitive as always. Our love of sports seems virtually insatiable. If
217 See SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 22, at 261.
2 18 Id at 261-62.
219 KNiGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 16.
220 SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 22, at 267 (emphasis added).
22 1 See DANmL L FuLKS, REVENUES AND E)ENSES OF DlvISION I AND H1
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLEnCS PROGRAMS: FINANCIAL TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS 1999
(2000), available at httpJ/www.ncaa.org/library/researchfiirev_exp/index.html.
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coed teams are what we have, coed teams are what we will watch. Even if this
assumption is wrong, however, the fans and the television networks should be our
last concern, not the first.
For those who believe that sporting events create a special sense of
institutional loyalty that is critical to the students' and the alumni's experience,
sporting events will continue to be plentiful. Many of the most prestigious
universities in the country have modest athletic enterprises yet manage to attract
the brightest students and retain the goodwill of their alumni. As already noted,
the connection between institutional fundraising and success in sports is a myth-
even winning teams in the biggest programs add nothing to institutional fund-
raising as a whole.222
7. Quotas and Equal Protection
The proposal presented is a quota and, on that basis alone, would trigger the
objections of some. "Affirmative action" is a highly charged term with the power
to polarize opinions in an instant. The concept of restitution for a victim of
discrimination has long been understood, if not almost universally accepted. The
concept of restitution for non-victims who share the race or sex of prior victims is
less easily absorbed. Though much debated in recent years, 223 affirmative action
remains a legally authorized option in a number of arenas: a private employer's
voluntary decision to overcome the effects of past industry or societal
discrimination,224 a public institution's choice to consider race as a factor in
admissions choices, 225 and a court's determination that pervasive and outrageous
employment discrimination in the past can only be remedied by temporary hiring
222 SHULMAN & BOwEN, supra note 22, at 223-26.
[1In assessing the arguments for and against the large investments in intercollegiate
athletics generally thought to be necessary to produce winning teams in the most
competitive settings, there is no evidence to suggest that "paybacks" will come in the form
of enhanced generosity of alunni/ae. Indeed, one of the more striking finding [sic] derived
from this year-by-year analysis is that at the most intensive level of play (NCAA Division
[I-A]), winning appears to have had, if anything, a modest negative effect on the overall
amount of alumni/ae giving.
Id.
223 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
2 2 4 Johnson v. Transp. Agency 480 U.S. 616, 619 (1987) (upholding an employer's
voluntary affirmative action plan for women in which sex was considered a "plus" factor);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979) (upholding an employer's voluntary
affirmative action plan which set aside half of the positions in a training program for African-
Americans).
225 Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-71 (1978). But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting "diversity" as a compelling government interest to justify
consideration of race in law school admissions).
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or promotions quotas.226 Even apart from such programs, we tacitly understand in
any number of settings that race or gender will be quietly considered in the
decisions being made in a more generalized striving for diversity.
The hope (if not the legal mandate) is that affirmative action measures are
temporary ones-as the educational institutions and workplaces become
increasingly diverse, the need for such formal or informal programs will become
increasingly unnecessary. The inherently segregated nature of middle/high school
and intercollegiate athletics, however, makes that aspiration impossible in this
arena. These institutions must choose in advance what sports will be offered for
each sex. Unlike almost any other program or opportunity, such as a math course
or an engineering program, it is generally impractical simply to offer the positions
and see who signs up (at least at the college level).
But a full-scale debate on affirmative action may not be necessary. A simpler
response is that Title IX already imposes a quota system as currently interpreted
by OCR and the courts. In order to be in full compliance with federal law, a
university may be required to match its student athlete slots to the percentage of
men and women in the student body. As discussed, this effectively may be the
only compliance option available to many schools under the court-enforced OCR
regulations.227 Although some commentators have attempted to dispute the
"quota" label, it is hard to avoid under the relatively rigid standards of the
proportionality requirement.228 The coed team quotas proposed here are not much
different in theory.
If we already are imposing quotas under Title IX, how has such an
interpretation escaped equal protection challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment? An in-depth analysis of the equal protection question is beyond the
226 See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 422 (1986)
("[A] district court may, in appropriate circumstances, order preferential relief benefiting
individuals who are not the actual victims of discrimination as a remedy for violation of Title
VI.").
227 See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
228 See JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING THE PLAYING FIEL: SCHooLs, SPORTS, SEX AND TITLE
IX (2002) (attacking stridently the "quota" aspect of Title IX's regulations); Walter B.
Connolly, Jr. & Jeffery D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX Gender Equity in
Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student Body Ratios, 71
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 845, 894-909 (1994); Christa D. Leahy, The Title Bout. A Critical
Review of the Regulation and Enforcement of Title IX in Intercollegiate Athletics, 24 J.C. &
U.L. 489, 489 (1997) ("Title IX has been transformed from a gender-equity mandate into an
affirmative action plan, which raises constitutional challenges to enforcement of the statute
under the Equal Protection Clause."); Note, Taking a Shot at the Title: A Critical Review of
Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic
Programs, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943, 977 (1995) (criticizing the proportionality test as a "quota
system"). Compare Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight
Gender Role Oppression, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1627, 1639-43 (1997), with Earl C. Dudley, Jr. &
George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Title VII,
and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 177, 210-25 (1999).
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scope of this article and has been provided by others, but some understanding of
the issue is indispensable for proceeding with the idea of mandating coed
teams.229
The equal protection debate in this area is not new. The First and Seventh
Circuits rejected equal protection arguments in Cohen v. Brown University230 and
Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois,231 respectively, reasoning
that Congress has broad powers to address past discrimination. One commentator
points out that both of these decisions relied on Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,232 a
decision that has since been renounced by the Supreme Court and replaced with
Adarand Constructors v. Pena.233 Thus, the argument continues, the underlying
authority supporting Title IX quotas no longer exists and the validity of the
regulations should be revisited.234
The Supreme Court precedent in question, however, dealt only with race and
the strict scrutiny standard applicable. To date, the Court has not addressed the
issue of sex-based quotas and the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard under
the equal protection clause.235 The current standard for gender classifications,
recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia,2 36 is
"important governmental objectives" and means that are "substantially related" to
those objectives. At least one commentator has asked the obvious question of
why the exclusion of women was rejected in the educational context but has been
accepted on the athletic side of the educational endeavor.237
8. Sports as a Meritocracy
To the extent that sports represents an arena of relatively clear meritocracy in
an otherwise complicated society--that is, the strongest, fastest, quickest get the
job-the proposal of mandatory coed teams significantly "damages" that
229 For discussions of these issues, see Leahy, supra note 230, and Robinson, supra note
210.
230 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 900-01 (1st Cir. 1993).
231 35 F.3d 265,272 (7th Cir. 1994).
232 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
233 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
234 See Leahy, supra note 230, at 532-33.
2 35 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), is the only Supreme Court
case to address a voluntary affirmative action program based on sex. Although a state agency
was involved, the Court avoided the constitutional issue because it was not addressed by the
parties or the lower courts. The Court thus limited itself to an analysis of the issue under Title
VII. Id. at 619 n.2.
236 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 210, at 333-39 (arguing that constitutional analysis
permits segregated sports only if tangible and intangible benefits are equivalent).
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value.238 The strongest, fastest female athlete on the football team likely will be
weaker and slower than one or more male football players who would have been
"next" in line for the available male positions. But issues of diversity often
present such difficult choices.
While the Olympics and professional sports may come close to this ideal of a
meritocracy, this value is regularly compromised in intercollegiate athletics. In at
least a partial effort to recognize the educational enterprise, the NCAA requires all
college athletes to meet minimum academic eligibility requirements both at the
time of admission and during the athlete's college career.239 Many schools
impose additional, higher academic standards in order for a potential athlete to
gain admission, in an attempt to bring the admission credentials of the student
athletes closer to the admission credentials of other, non-athlete applicants. This
"value," however, is compromised as well. Many schools apparently admit
athletes with lower credentials at a significantly higher rate than non-athletes--the
"admissions advantage" documented and described by Shulman and Bowen.240
In other words, non-athlete applicants with better academic records and
credentials are being denied admission in order to make room for athletes. Our
colleges and universities thus already are engaged in a tug-of-war between
aspirations of recruiting the best football team and aspirations of bringing some
academic integrity to the process.
Colleges and universities choose to admit students based on a variety of
factors, not simply those with the highest test scores. And surely most, if not all,
of the administrators and commentators who struggle with these issues would
balk at the suggestion of permitting the "best" athletes to play college football
regardless of high school records or current academic standings. While we may
argue about what it should mean to be a "student athlete," no one has proposed
eliminating the "student" label or requirements altogether as an unnecessary
impediment to recruiting the best possible team. Admission to schools of higher
education and the chance to play intercollegiate sports at those schools is far from
a "merit system," even as currently operated. The implementation of coed teams
may add another layer of complexity (reflecting additional values of our
educational system), but it would not be the first.
238 The values reflected by sports programs are, of course, far more extensive than
meritocracy alone. For a broad-ranging discussion about sports and values, see Texas Law
Review's entire Symposium issue on the subject. Symposium, Sports Law as a Reflection of
Society's Laws and Values, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 999-1173 (1997).
239 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc Ass'N, NCAA 2002-03 DrvsioN I MANUAL 125
(2002), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/divisioni manual/2002-
03/A14.pdf.
240 See SHULMAN & BowEN, supra note 22, at 29-58 (discussing the admission of male
athletes), 126-56 (discussing the admission of female athletes).
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9. The Issue of Race
The issues of race, gender equity, and intercollegiate athletics are
complicated.241 When the number of scholarships permitted in men's basketball
was cut by the NCAA in an effort to increase the proportionate number of women
participants under Title IX, African-American basketball coaches of men's
college teams protested the move because it limited opportunities for African-
American players (who typically are represented at a disproportionately high rate
in men's basketball, as compared to the general student body).242 Along the same
lines, some commentators have argued that the addition of women's teams to
satisfy gender equity requirements has only benefited Caucasian women. The
kinds of sports being added, such as tennis, golf, and synchronized swimming, are
sports in which few African-American women participate.243 In addition, some of
those slots have come from football and men's basketball, disproportionately
disadvantaging African-American men.244
No doubt athletic scholarships have provided educational opportunities for
deserving African-American men and women that would otherwise have been
unable to access a college education. Many would agree that institutions of higher
education (especially public universities) have a responsibility to promote
diversity and provide educational opportunities to the economically
disadvantaged of our society, but athletic programs actually may add little to that
goal. Shulman and Bowen report that "recruitment of athletes has no marked
effect on either the socioeconomic composition of these schools or on their racial
diversity. '245 Eliminating the athletic programs in that study's group of cohorts
241 See Alfred D. Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the
Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 239 (1996); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports,
6 MARQ. SPORT's L.J. 229 (1996).
242 See Steve Berkowitz & Mark Asher, BCA Delays Boycott; Justice Department Offers
to Mediate, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at Dl; Steve Berkowitz & Mark Asher, Black Coaches
Cut Talks with NCAA; Support Sought for Possible Boycott, WASH POST, Jan. 13, 1994, at D 1.
243 See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender
Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REv. 329, 350 (1996) ("African-American
women athletes, like their male counterparts, largely have not gained access to all
intercollegiate women's sports and are concentrated in two sports: basketball and track.").
244 See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffery D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title
IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on
Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 845 (1994).
[Tihe true beneficiaries of interest and skill determined by enrollment percentages are
middle or upper class white women.... This benefit comes at the expense of African-
American males who are overrepresented in sports such as football and basketball-sports
from which funding must be cut to facilitate the new female sports.
Id. at 847.
245 SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 22, at 261 (emphasis added).
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from 1989 would have lowered the number of African-American men at these
schools by a mere 1%.246
The number of schools involved in the Shulman/Bowen research may well be
too small a sample to generalize for the hundreds of colleges and universities with
large sports programs. But the Shulman/Bowen conclusion was based on the
complete elimination of athletic programs. The proposal here may result in fewer
total athletes at each institution, but many of the talented African-American male
athletes currently participating in Division I-A programs (particularly in football
and basketball) likely will be included in those recruited for the coed teams
created. In addition, the spots for women on the coed football teams may provide
new opportunities for African-American women who now are concentrated in
basketball and track.247 The net impact on diversity thus could be minimal, even
at schools where the number of African-American male athletes adds
significantly to the diversity of the student body.
There is also something inherently troubling about the concept of
"protecting" men's football in order to promote diversity in higher education. The
argument could imply that African-American students can best contribute to an
institution by excelling in sports, creating or reinforcing a different kind of
stereotype that is just as destructive as the stereotypes attached to female
athletes. 248 Nothing in the idea of coed teams prevents a university from
continuing efforts to promote diversity and financially support its disadvantaged
minority students. Tying these goals to intercollegiate athletics does a disservice
to both enterprises.
Scholarships are a critical component in providing meaningful access to
higher education, but athletic talent may be a particularly inefficient way to
allocate those resources. If the goal is to increase educational opportunities for
African-Americans and other minority and economically disadvantaged students,
the university's funds are better spent on those most likely to succeed and
graduate-a group not well represented by those playing high profile sports. With
academic potential instead of athletic talent as the defining criterion, other
minority applicants may be far more deserving of the sometimes lavish support
we now provide our high profile male athletes.
246 Id.
247 See Smith, supra note 245, at 350.
248 Issues of racism in athletics are beyond the scope of this discussion, but have been
explored by others. See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of
Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 658-78 (1995); Timothy Davis,
Racism in Athletics: Subtle Yet Persistent, 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 881 (1999);
Mathewson, supra note 235; Smith, supra note 245; Yarbrough, supra note 243; supra notes
239-40.
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C. Women in Coaching
While it is tempting to include in the proposal for coed teams a further
requirement that half of all coaches be female as well, the legal issues involving
employment may be even more complicated. Title VII might permit such a
voluntary affirmative action program for a private employer, 249 but public
universities would be faced with constitutional questions.250 Access to
employment also raises different issues and concerns, at least for me, than access
to a school sports' team as a part of a student's education.
The full integration of women into coaching may be a gradual by-product of
coed teams, although not as instantaneous. With half of every team composed of
women, the pressure to include women on the coaching staffs seems inevitable
and almost immediate. If the men's and women's basketball teams are combined
into a single team, the coaching staff presumably will be combined as well, but
with half of the coaches losing their positions. Assuming there are both female
and male assistant coaches in the pool, for example, schools likely will be looking
for some gender balance to work with the new "blended" teams. Identifying
qualified female football coaches may take more time, but with half of all the
school players female, women should be finding their way into the profession
within just one or two generations of players.
Schools may also need to rethink traditional coaching qualifications as the
institutions reevaluate the new role of sports. A different kind of team and a
different kind of sports environment may well demand a different kind of coach.
At the intercollegiate level, any coach who hopes to be successful in the long run
must do far more than tolerate his female athletes; such an attitude will send the
best female recruits searching for another school. A football coach who chooses
to disdain his female players may soon find himself with only half a team.
While the full integration of women into coaching may be a more
incremental process, the introduction of coed teams would eliminate immediately
issues of salary in equity. Disparities in coaching salaries for men's and women's
teams would disappear because there would no longer be segregated teams. No
doubt at the intercollegiate level the market for football and basketball coaches
likely would continue to outpace the market for coaches of track, swimming, field
hockey, and other low profile sports. But these distinctions would no longer
include a message to our female athletes about their value relative to their male
counterparts. A female basketball player would "benefit" from the higher priced
249 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (holding that the
"[algency appropriately took into account [the plaintiff's] sex as one factor in determining that
she should be promoted.").
250 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (holding an
affirmative action plan for teachers unconstitutional in light of the absence of convincing
evidence of prior discrimination by a governmental entity).
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talent of a well-paid basketball coach to the same extent as a male basketball
player.
Distinctions in coaching salaries based on the sex of the team represent only a
part of the problem, of course. The Knight Commission discusses with dismay the
million dollar coaching contracts for the high profile men's teams, and one of the
Commission's recommendations is to bring these salaries more in line with the
salary structure of the institution. 251 Coed teams may do little to address this
issue. Coed sports give us a "fresh" start with a different vision of our athletic
programs, however. This new beginning may provide an opportunity to reassess a
salary scale that, like much else in high profile intercollegiate athletics, has been
driven by the pressure of professional sports. Even if this assumption is overly
optimistic, there may be some satisfaction in knowing that we are paying for a
different kind of skill. In the long run, the successful coaches may be those who
learn to integrate the teams and adjust the game to take advantage of all of their
players, rather than forcing women to replicate the existing styles and strategies.
D. Problems of Academic and Financial Integrity
Even if one finds the idea of coed football ridiculous, it is at least apparent
how such a proposal might solve many of the subtle and not-so-subtle issues of
gender equity in athletics. Men and women would have the same access to the
same sports being played under completely identical conditions. But how would
coed teams eliminate the rampant problems of academic and financial integrity
identified by the Knight Commission and the Shulman/Bowen research? There
may be nothing inherent in the nature of coed versus sex-segregated sports teams
that will stop or even slow down these escalating problems in big-time sports. The
current quagmire could continue unabated, the proposal simply adding more
women to the mix as potential victims or beneficiaries, depending on your
perspective.
Proposing coed sports teams as a "cure" for the professionalism and
commercialism "diseases" of the high profile sports is, admittedly, speculative at
best. There are some grounds for cautious optimism, however. The sports that
drive these trends-men's football and men's basketball-will no longer exist.
Pressure to replicate the professional teams at the college level may diminish
significantly when those teams cease to "look" the same. In adapting to integrate
women, the college coaches may well be developing and coaching a different
kind of game.
The Knight Commission and Shulman/Bowen agree that intercollegiate
athletics are out of control and urge the academic leadership of higher education
251 KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 27 ("Consider coaches' compensation in the
context of the academic institutions that employ them. Coaches' jobs should be primarily to
educate young people. Their compensation should be brought into line with prevailing norms
across the institution.").
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to take back the responsibility and oversight for these programs. 252 The challenge
may be something like stopping a runaway train; the odds of slowing the
momentum seem slim without derailing it altogether. The experiences of the last
decade should make us pessimistic about expecting change when operating the
same programs under the same pressures on the thin hope that our administrators
will be able to take charge if only they try harder.
The Knight Commission and the Shulman/Bowen recommendations rely
heavily on the ability of academic leaders and administrators to reassert control
over the institution's athletic programs. Introducing coed sports could provide the
kind of "shock to the system" that demands a fundamental re-evaluation and the
catalyst to make such leadership possible. Changing a few rules about eligibility
or putting more controls on corporate sponsorships does little to undermine the
basic nature of these programs. Coed teams assume, at least in the short run, that
fielding the "best" football or basketball team is no longer the goal. If this were
the objective, competitive and gender-blind selection would be warranted, and
men likely would dominate those teams. Indeed, given the structure and built-in
biases of the current system, only men would be selected because only men
would be recruited. In big time college sports, the team is chosen long before any
tryout opportunities.
Our schools need new goals and a new vision for sports programs-a
different way of looking at this particular function within the mission of an
academic institution. That task will be more attainable if we can begin by altering
the very nature of the entity. The drastic and fundamental change proposed here
has at least that potential. It is a different "beast" because it challenges our basic
assumptions about sports.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our society has been struggling for over half a century to understand and
address the race and sex discrimination that permeates much of our history. There
are few opportunities for quick fixes. Title VII has been on the books for almost
forty years, yet women and minorities remain behind in salary and access to the
best jobs. Our schools were desegregated fifty years ago, yet the quality of
education for many of our minority children continues to lag. Progress has, at
times, been frustratingly slow on both fronts. School sports, admittedly a small
piece of these broader problems, have been relegated to the same slow advances
with no real end in sight.
The real travesty of Mercer v. Duke University was more than simply
Mercer's lost opportunity to play a college sport, or an anachronistic rule about
women's acceptable roles. An institution as prestigious as Duke University-
252 See KNIGHT REPORT 2001, supra note 7, at 26; SHULMAN & BOwEN, supra note 22, at
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headed by one of the most accomplished women in university
administration253-should be embarrassed that it was reduced to defending this
action. As stated in Duke University's own annual report for 2000-2001,
"American higher education is widely admired throughout the world. Private
research universities occupy a special place in American higher education, and
Duke University ranks in the top echelon of those institutions. 254 As the leader in
higher education that it purports to be, the university should be at the forefront of
equal opportunity instead of hiding behind archaic notions of sports and women.
Coach Fuhr's employer, Hazel Park School District, similarly is teaching its
younger students by example and should be aspiring to no less.
Creating coed sports offers a rare opportunity to address issues of
discrimination by fundamentally rethinking and reconstituting the way we look at
this part of our world. The lessons our students are learning in the examples set by
the current system of segregation reinforces the basic message that the girls are
not good enough and never will be. This message is far from the inherent truth we
have accepted it to be. It is, instead, a byproduct of the way in which we have
chosen (or have allowed others) to define the system. Our educational system, as
it has in countless other arenas, should be leading the way instead of reinforcing
the status quo. Unless our schools can bring to the game the same educational
character they bring to their other endeavors, they should not be playing at all.
253 Dr. Nannerl 0. Koehane has been the president of Duke University since 1993. She
has a Ph.D. from Yale University, and has taught at Swarthmore College, the University of
Pennsylvania, and Stanford University. Prior to assuming the presidency at Duke, she had been
president of Wellesley College since 1981. For more biographical information on Dr. Koehane
see http://www.duke.edu/web/president/Bio.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2002).
2 5 4 DUKE UNIv., BUILDING ON EXCELLENCE: THE UNIVERsrrY PLAN 4 (2001), available at
http://xena.oit.duke.edu/planning/univupdatell.pdf.
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